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ABSTRACT

The Federal and California False Claims Acts

(FCA)

are "whistle blower" legislation which encourage anyone

who is aware of a false claim, to come forward and win a
percentage of the money collected in successful
litigation. These laws are based on European laws and were

first instituted in the United States by President Lincoln
during the Civil War. Revised versions of these laws made
them more useful and much FCA litigation has brought in

considerable dollars across the United States. This paper
explores the implications of these laws in particular for
the California Department of Transportation.
The construction of state highway projects is bid out

each year at approximately three billion dollars. Claims
from contractors for additional compensation are common.
This paper investigates the policies and procedures for

handling claims and explores the FCA case law and its'
implications for the Department of Transportation's
contract administration.

The FCA case law establishes the constitutionally of
the act, defines the public disclosure bar and original

source provisions of the law and provides guidance with

respect to the government intervention provisions of the
law. In addition the case law gives good examples relevant

iii

to the construction industry. The act has proven itself
constitutionally sound. Supreme Court rulings have

addressed concerns with violation of the separation of

powers requirements of the constitution, whether a qui tam

(plaintiff) has standing and the possible violation of the

due process requirements of the constitution.
Caltrans has well-established methods for handling
construction claims for additional compensation, including

Dispute Review Boards, Board of Reviews and a legal
department to handle settlements and arbitration. Many
changes occur during the administration of a construction
project. These changes are handled through contract change

orders. Many times however, disputes between the state and
the contractors over the merit and cost lead to unsettled
claims for additional compensation. Most times the claims
are honest contract disputes, however sometimes these

claims are fraudulent and costs are exaggerated. This
paper addresses the implications of FCA actions by the

government and/or private qui tam litigation against
contractors and the claims submitted to the state on

Caltrans' construction projects.
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CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND

Introduction to the Study

As the author of this paper I currently work for the
California Department of Transportation. I am a Senior

Bridge Engineer working in construction. It is the Senior
Bridge Engineer's responsibility to supervise Resident

Engineers, Structure Representatives, and Assistant

Structure Representatives. The primary function of these
staff is to administer the department's construction

contracts. Often questions are asked regarding the False
Claims Acts and the implications for the California

Department of Transportation highway construction
programs.

The California Department of Transportation is

responsible for the planning, design, construction,
improvement, operation, maintenance, rehabilitation and

seismic retrofit of the state highway system (20:49).

California's state highways support the vast majority of

all travel in the state, including both personal and

commercial transportation. "The state highway system,
which comprises less than nine percent of the total

roadway mileage in California, handles fifty-three percent
of the miles traveled (10:82)".
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The department's highest priorities are maintaining
and rehabilitating roads and highways while building new

projects. The Capital Outlays Projects program funds the
contracts for this work (14:3). These contracts are

typically awarded to the lowest bidder.

Private construction contractors are responsible for
the fulfillment of these contracts. The Department of

Transportation's engineers are given the responsibility of
administrating these contracts. The State Transportation

Improvement Program (STIP) makes up the majority of these
construction contracts and has an annual budget of
approximately three billion dollars

(7:6). The STIP

determines which contracts will be funded chronologically
for the state of California on a seven-year time frame.

The construction companies awarded the construction
contracts are required by each project contract to adhere
to the plans, specifications and special provisions of the

state. Administration of these contracts requires

inspection to guarantee that the contract requirements are
meet. The state's engineers are responsible for
construction inspection. Additionally, the engineer must
process payments based upon job completion levels

throughout the course of the project.
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The Caltrans Organization Chart
Like many other bureaucracies the Caltrans'

organizational chart can be characterized as a rational,
conscious and institutionalized arrangement of the
division of labor (27:4).

Similar to the Weberian concept

of bureaucratic organizations where the division of labor

must be carried out through non overlapping functional

divisions, with a hierarchy of coordination and control
with procedures and rules of action (28:4). The Caltrans'
organizational chart is arranged in two fashions both

horizontally and vertically (See Appendix A). The
horizontal one is a hierarchical ordering from the
organizations' director enumerating down to each deputy

director as the department heads are called. The
organization chart functions as an image map that link

organization chart "boxes" to the respective function

statements for each division. For example, the Accounting
and Budget departments are below the Finance Deputy

Director, as the Network Operations Department is under
Information Technology Deputy and the Construction and
Design departments are under Project Delivery Deputy.

These charts graphically illustrate the administrative
structure of the different functional units within the

organization.
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Additionally on the far right of the chart it is
organized vertically. Each vertical box represents a

region with the state of California. The regions are

divided geographic regions. These regions are called

districts and numbered 1 through 12 statewide (See
Appendix A). Traditionally these regions try to follow
already dictated boundaries like the county line. For

example, Region 8 contains the geographical areas of
Riverside and San Bernardino counties.

Statement of the Problem

On state construction projects often the construction
contractor will file a "notice of potential claims" for

additional compensation. These claims may be based upon
alterations of the original contract or unforeseen work or
ambiguities in the contract. When merit is found in the

contractor's claim, changes are handled with contract
change orders

(CCOs). The CCOs are laid out on a

standardized form and are most times negotiated by the
state engineers on the project and the contractor's

superintendent at the job site. Statewide, these claims

amount to hundreds of millions of dollars annually. These
claims are either settled at the project level with CCOs,
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settled after the contract is completed, or settled in

arbitration.
Many of the claims submitted are considered to be
without merit by the state at the project level. However,

these claims are often settled as a "business decision"
after the project completion. Typically, this is a more

cost-effective solution rather than the cost of litigation
in arbitration.

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to analyze the Federal
and State of California's False Claims Acts and ascertain

the implications for the California Department of

Transportation. The California Department of
Transportation is believed to be experiencing a

significant number of false claims in the Capital Outlays
(Construction)

Projects. The study will utilize

legislative, managerial and financial analysis techniques
to examine the impacts of false claims upon the Department
of Transportation Construction Projects.

This study is significant because of the large amount
of money spent on claims considered to be without merit or

fraudulent statewide. Throughout the construction process,
it is the engineer's responsibility to protect the state's

interest and the state's dollars. The investigation will
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expand, upon the legislative analyses and discuss the

ramifications of the implementation of these laws with
respect to past and current situations.
This study differs from previous studies on the False

Claims Act,

since it focuses on the implication for the

California Department of Transportation. Specifically,
this investigation is limited to the new construction and

rehabilitation projects, included in the Capital Outlays'

funds. Other reviews and studies of the False Claims Act

will be illustrated in the literature review section. They

will be used to support the analysis portion of the study
and to demonstrate the problem through case reviews. This

investigation extends present knowledge by examining it

under the context of construction issues.
Crucial to the research goals are studying the

department's organizational structure and the construction
claims process. This paper will include a detailed look at
the organizational structure from planning to design
through construction to maintenance. The construction

process will be examined focusing on the claims process.
The objective will be a thorough understanding of the

process. The research will also examine data collected
statewide relative to claims, settlements and

arbitrations.
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I

An analysis of statewide construction projects will

be included. Data will be complied for a study of
construction claims throughout the state. Cost on claims

will be reviewed on a district by district basis.

Settlement and arbitration results will be compiled, again
by district; to determine construction claims costs. The

Capital Outlays Project budget will be studied to better

understand the impacts of claims on the State
Transportation Improvement Program.

Departmental organization charts will be included and

shown to illustrate the hierarchy used to make policy
decisions. Interviews and surveys will be conducted to

ensure all possible policies are researched and

investigated. Caltrans' officials will be asked for
personal accounts of administration where false claims are
suspected. And all findings, conclusions and

recommendations will then be presented in the work.

Theoretical Basis and Organization

The work is organized based on a categorical system.

Review of the case law is based upon each unique aspect of
the legislation. The history of the advent of the

legislation is organized in a chronological fashion dating
from its inception, through the Lincoln presidency,

and to

the current versions of the federal law. The state version
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of the law for California and other states will be
discussed as it may pertain to case studies.

Lawyers publicize many other False Claim studies, in
order to keep them abreast of the legislation so that they

may represent clients to the best of their abilities.
Prosecuting or defending parties to False Claims Act suits

can enhance a lawyer's reputation and are often publicized
due to the large monetary awards associated with some of

the cases.

Other research on the False Claims Act is performed
by non-profit organizations such as the Taxpayers Against

Fraud. This organization hopes to alleviate over spending
in the public sector so that all Americans benefit by

paying less tax.
Additionally other non-profit organizations like the

Government Accountability Project

(GAP)

act to litigate

whistleblower cases. Their mission is to protect the

public interest by promoting government and corporate
accountability through advancing occupational free speech
and ethical conduct, defending whistleblowers, and

empowering citizen activists. Founded in 1977, GAP is a

public interest organization and law firm that receives

funding from foundations, individuals, and legal fees
(15:1) .
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The theoretical basis 'for the study is that the State
of California through the Caltrans' Capital Outlay's

budget is paying too many falsely submitted construction
claims for new highway construction and rehabilitation

projects. Is this caused by fraud? Does submitting a
fraudulent notice of potential claim constitute a

violation of the False Claims Act? Does payment have to be

made in order for a false claim to be a violation of the
False Claims Act? Can the state benefit from the

Department of Transportation's use of the Federal or State
False Claims Acts? Will this legislation help reduce costs

for the Caltrans' organization?

Is there a down side to

the prosecution of state contractors using the False

Claims Act?

The conceptual framework is that the laws provide a
financial remedy for abuse. Is the state able to utilize

these laws for it's financial advantage? Can the state
recoup any loses they have already incurred on

construction fraud? Will utilizing the legislation

increase Caltrans' legislative budget? How would the
implementation of these laws affect the organization? A
look at the potential impacts on the department will

include the affects on policy, management and the budget.
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One hypothesis is that the state is paying millions
in construction claims. Are all these claims warranted?

Are they being settled properly to the financial advantage
or disadvantage of the state? Another hypothesis is that

by utilizing the Federal or State False Claims Acts the
state will reduce construction claims and thereby save

money.

Limitations of the Study

One of the primary limitations of the study is that

we will use historical claims for analysis since we are

not aware of all current construction claims as they are
occurring on a daily basis all across the state of

California and the nation. This presents us with a
methodological limitation for the study. The research will
work around this limitation by using this historical

background as a lessons-learned basis for future claim
analysis.

Another limitation of the study is that "engineering
judgement and discretion" are often factored into the

negotiation of construction claims. This represents a
content limitation for the study.

The research will work

around these limitations by offering different
interpretation of the engineer's judgement when necessary
in an attempt to explain the construction difficulty.
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One other content limitation is that the study will

use case law from, other industries

(medical, aerospace,

technology, etc...) where it is relevant to the analysis.
The study will work around this limitation by using the

case law for demonstration purposes only.
One delimitation for the work is that we will not

study every federal and state False Claims Act case.
Currently, the federal cases number 4,281 and have
recovered over 12 billion dollars since 1986

(9:1).

Inclusion of this many case studies would be prohibitive.
Cases will be selected based on the nature of the law that
they illustrate and as they relate to construction issues.

Nomenclature
•

Arbitration: the hearing and determination of a case in

controversy by an arbiter (a person with power to

decide a dispute)
•

Bounty: a reward, premium, or subsidy especially when
offered or given by a government: as an extra allowance
to induce entry into the armed services or a grant to

encourage an industry
•

Caltrans: The California Department of Transportation

•

CCOs: contract change orders, changes to the original
contract, which are contracts within themselves
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•

Capital Outlays-: are expenditures that result in

acquisitions of, additions to, replacement of or major
repairs to fixed assets that will benefit current and
future fiscal periods. Capital outlays are accounted

for within the state of California budget

•

Claim: is defined as including "...any request or demand,
whether under a contract or otherwise,

for money or

property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or

other
•

CPB-: Construction Procedures Bulletin, issued by
Caltrans to keep field engineers updated on latest

changes in construction procedures

•

DRBs: Dispute Review Boards, began in 1990 as a remedy
for settling claims on construction projects statewide.
They act as a neutral third party on construction

conflicts to provide an opinion on the merit of claims
for large projects

•

Dicta: a noteworthy statement: as a formal

pronouncement of a principle, proposition, or opinion

or an observation intended or regarded as authoritative
or a judge’s expression of opinion on a point other

than the precise issue involved in determining a case
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•

Due process: a course of formal proceedings

(as legal

proceedings) carried out regularly and in accordance
with established rules and principles — called also
procedural due process or a judicial requirement that
enacted laws may not contain provisions that result in

the unfair, arbitrary, or unreasonable treatment of an
individual — called also substantive due process

•

Interest: an excess above what is due or expected or

feeling that accompanies or causes special attention to
an object or class of objects or something that arouses

such attention
«

Knowing: is having actual knowledge of information,
acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falseness

of information. Additionally, knowing means to act in

reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the

information. From a legal perspective no proof of

specific intent to defraud is required

•

PFCRA: Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act is a mini False
Claims Act remedy. Useful for small claims, under

$150,000, enacted in 1986
•

Person:

includes any natural person,

corporation,

firm, association, organization, partnership,

liability company, business, or trust (4:3)
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limited

•

Preponderance: a superiority in weight, power,
importance, or strength or a superiority or excess in
number or quantity

•

Profiteer: one who makes what is considered an

unreasonable profit especially on the sale of essential

goods during times of emergency
Qui tam’. is short for a Latin phrase,

"qui tam pro

domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,"

which roughly means "...he who brings an action for the

king as well as for himself.

(2:1)"

•

Recipient: one that receives

•

Rehabilitation: to restore or bring to a condition of
health or useful and constructive activity

•

Seismic: of,

subject to, or caused by an earthquake;

also of or relating to an earth vibration caused by

something else

•

Redressability: is a substantial likelihood that

the requested relief will remedy the injury
•

Relator: For the purposes of the False- Claims Act the
relator is defined as the individual who brought a case

of fraud to the attention of the government
•

Bipartisan: of, relating to, or involving members of
two

(political) parties
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«

Relief-: removal or lightening of something oppressive,

painful, or distressing (elaborate here based on the
case law)
•

STIP: California's State Transportation Improvement

Program, a seven-year document published by the state,

which dictates the schedule of future construction

projects
«

Whistle-blower-: one who reveals something covert or who

informs against another
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CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction
The literature review will be accomplished
predominately through the use of case law. The review will
begin with the historical beginnings of the original

Federal False Claims legislation. Next relevant amendments
to the legislation will be surveyed.

Applicable case law

will be used to demonstrate the components of the

legislation. Relevant construction cases will be addressed
in a separate section.

The California False Claims Act will be included for

its relevance to the organization we are reviewing. A

history of the California legislation will be added for
illustration of similarities and differences in the laws.

Finally, additional case law will be employed to

illustrate outcomes of construction fraud cases that are
relevant to the work and the organization.

History of the False Claims Act
"The action originally gained popularity in 13th

century England" (42) . Most United States laws are based
on English common law. Common law relies on lawyers to

represent the client's case. Decisions under common law
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were made based on prior tradition and precedence. The

form of reasoning used in common law is known as casuistry
or case-based reasoning. Common law may be unwritten or

written. The common law, as applied in civil cases was a
way of compensating the injured party for wrongful acts

known as torts.

(17:1)

As the colonies of the United States formed its new

government after the revolution we relied on European

history to guide our practice. The Continental Congress in
the early days of government in the United States enacted
a number of qui tam provisions. Benjamin Franklin has been

quoted as saying:

"There is no kind of dishonesty into

which otherwise good people more easily and frequently
fall than that of defrauding the government"

(2:1).

The Federal False Claims Act being used today passed

during the American Civil War. The act is commonly
referred to as the "Lincoln Law" and was passed, by

Congress on March 2, 1863. This law was enacted out of a

frustration with poor goods and services being provided to
the government by dishonest suppliers. During the war,

boxes of sawdust were being delivered in place of guns,
and instances of the same horses being sold over and over
to the Union Army were discovered. One war profiteer
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boasted "You can sell anything to the government at almost

any price you've got the guts to ask"
The War Department

(4: 1).

(now known as the Department of

Defense) did not have the resources to track down the
fraudulent suppliers. Additionally,

the U. S. Attorney

General Office did not have the staff to attack the
problem. As a result President Abraham Lincoln pushed for

passage of the False Claims Act.

(30:1)

The False Claims Act included "qui tain" provisions
that allowed private citizens to sue, on the government's
behalf, companies and individuals that were defrauding the

government. "Qui tam" is short for a Latin phrase,

"qui

tain pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte
sequitur," which roughly means "he who brings an action
for the king as well as for himself."

(30:2)

The purpose

of the False Claims Act was to provide a means to motivate

private individuals to "blow the whistle" on known cases
of fraud perpetrated against the government. The

individual who brought a case of fraud to the attention of

the government

(referred to as the relator in the False

Claims Act) would be given a percentage of the fines

imposed on the guilty party.
The penalty for defrauding the government was a two
thousand dollar fine for each false claim plus double the
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amount of the false claims submitted. The relator, who
brought the suit to the attention of the government,

received 50% of the amount collected plus his legal costs.
In 1943, the Supreme Court ruled in United States ex

rel. Marcus v. Hess that the relator could bring action

under the Federal Claims Act on behalf of the U.S.
government, even though the action was based solely on

information acquired from the government.

(41:2)

This

meant the relator did not need to have first hand

knowledge of the fraud, but simple could use the
information learned from newspaper accounts and government

records. A number of cases were brought by relators, where
the information was based solely on government documents,

congressional hearings and news accounts. As a result the

False Claims Act was significantly amended in 1946.
The 1946 amendment to the False Claims Act attempted
to correct the ruling of the Supreme Court. However, it

went too far and made the False Claims Act ineffectual.

The 1946 amendment reduced the percent the relator

received from 50% to 25%

(10% if the government joined the

action). And more significantly, it prohibited lawsuits
based on evidence or information the government was

already aware of. This meant, if any government official

had any knowledge or information regarding the claim, or
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if any government file or record contained any information

concerning the case, then the relator could not use this

information when bringing the suit. This was true even if

the government officials were not investigating the case
or if the relator was the source of the government

knowledge. As a result the False Claims Act became

virtually unusable for the next forty years.
This was true until the mid-1980s, when President
Reagan proposed a new philosophy. President Reagan
campaigned on the concept of increased responsibility of

the private sector, privatization of government functions
and the use of market forces to enhance government
services.

(37:2) President Reagan also dramatically

increased defense spending, which lead to numerous highly

publicized cases of over-spending on government contracts.
The ability of the government officials to administrate
and control this increase in spending was insufficient due
to lack of resources and legal tools. Government officials

also stated it was difficult to get individuals with
knowledge of fraud to speak up for fear they would lose

their jobs.
In 1985, the Department of Defense reported that 45
of the largest 100 defense contractors — including nine

of the top 10 — were under investigation for multiple
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fraud, offenses."

(30:2)

In 1986, after high-profile

hearings revealed that the Department of Defense was

purchasing $435 claw hammers, $640 toilet seats,

and

$7,600 coffee makers, Congress decided to take action

(24:2) . It amended the False Claims Act, after
congressional hearings exposed widespread military
contractors’ fraud, including defective products,
substitution of inferior materials and illegal price
gouging. The 1986 amendment empowered ordinary citizens to

act as private attorneys general by filing qui tarn
whistleblower suits against individuals or entities that

have defrauded or cheated the government.

(5:2)

A bipartisan passage of a series of amendments to
False Claims Act was put into law on October 27,

1986 (See

Appendix B). These amendments provided better ability for
"whistle blowers" to file suit in qui tam cases. Frank

Hunger, the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil
Division praised the work of Senator Charles Grassley of
Iowa and Representative Howard L. Berman of California,

who sponsored the 1986 whistle blower provisions

(9:1).

In addition, the percent a whistle blower would

receive was increased to 30%

(15% if the government

partnered in the action). Attorneys were also given

assurance that their legal fees would be covered in
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successful litigation. Companies filing fraudulent claims,

in addition to paying triple the amount of the claims, can
also be fined $5,000 to $10,000 for each false claim.

Since the passage of the amendments to the False
Claims Act in 1986, the number of cases filed has

increased dramatically. "More than 3,000 qui tam cases

have been filed since 1986."

(9:2)

The False Claims Act Law

The United States Code section 3729, Title 31 Money
and Finance, Subtitle III - Financial Management, Chapter
37 - Claims, Subchapter III - Claims Against The United

States Government, Section 3729 - False Claims, states

"Tiny person who knowingly presents, or causes to be
presented, to an officer or employee of the United States

Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United

States Government a false or fraudulent claim for payment
or approval... is liable to the United States Government for

a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than

$10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the
Government sustains because of the act of that person..."
(24:1) Additionally,

any person who conspires to defraud

the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim
allowed or paid is liable. Any person who has "has

possession, custody, or control of property or money used,
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or to be used, by the Government and,

intending to defraud

the Government or willfully to conceal the property,

delivers, or causes to be delivered, less property than
the amount for which the person receives a certificate or
receipt"

(35:1), is liable. Any person who is authorized

to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of

property used, or to be used, by the Government and,
intending to defraud the Government, makes or delivers the

receipt without completely knowing that the information on
the receipt is true"

(35:1), is liable. Any person who

"knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation
or debt, public property from an officer or employee of

the Government, or a member of the Armed Forces, who
lawfully may not sell or pledge the property" (35:1), is

liable. Any person who "knowingly makes, uses, or causes
to be made or used, a false record or statement to

conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or

transmit money or property to the Government"

(35:1), is

liable.

The term "knowing" is defined by having actual
knowledge of the information, acts in deliberate ignorance

of the truth or falsity of information. Additionally,

"knowing" means to act in reckless disregard of the truth
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or falsity of the information, and no proof of specific

intent to defraud is required.
The term "claim" is defined as including "...any

request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise,

for money or property which is made to a contractor,
grantee, or other recipient..."

(35:2)

Provided "...the United

States Government provides any portion of the money or
property which is requested or demanded, or if the
Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or

other recipient for any portion of the money or property
which is requested or demanded." (35:2)

There are exceptions when "the person committing the
violation of this subsection furnished officials of the

United States responsible for investigating false claims

violations with all information known to such person about
the violation within 30 days after the date on which the

defendant first obtained the information."

(35:2)

This

person must cooperate fully with any Government

investigation. There can be no criminal prosecution, civil
action or administrative action commenced under the title
with respect to violation.

Under section 3730 - Civil actions for false claims,
the responsibility of enforcement is given to the Attorney

General. The Attorney General is required to diligently
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investigate any violation. After investigation, the
Attorney General may bring civil action.

Anybody may bring action for a violation of the False
Claims Act and must do so in their name and in the name of
the Government. Dismissal of the action requires a court

and the Attorney to give written consent to the dismissal

with reasons for the dismissal. If the Government decides
to proceed with an action, this must be done within 60

days of receiving the complaint and evidence in the case.

With good cause the Government may ask for extensions from

the court. If the defendant can show to the court that the

litigation brought by the person is for the purposes of
harassment the court may limit the participation by the

person bringing the litigation.
In cases where the Government decides not to proceed

with the action, the person bringing the litigation shall

have the right to conduct the action. If the Government
request the copies of pleadings and transcripts, they
shall be provided to the Government.
If the Government proceeds with the action, the

person bringing the action (the relator)

shall receive at

least 15% but not more the 25% of the proceeds of the

action. This is true unless the court determines the
findings are primarily based on evidence other than that
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provided by the relator. In this ease, the relator is
entitled to no more than 10%. In addition to the

percentages listed above the relator is entitled to

expenses, plus attorney fees and costs.
If the Government does not proceed with the action,

the relator is entitled to 25% to 30%. The court decides
the amount between 25% and 30% based on the contribution
to the case by the relator..In addition to this

percentage, the relator is entitled to expenses, plus
attorney fees and costs.

In the cases where the defendant prevails in the
action, the court may award the defendant attorney fees

and costs. This is true when the court finds that the

person bringing the action was clearly vexatious,
frivolous or brought primarily for the purpose of
harassment.
Certain persons are barred by the law in bring

action. No member of the armed forces may bring an action

against the armed forces, arising from service in the

armed forces. No action may be brought against a member of
Congress, a member of the Judiciary or a senior executive
branch official, if the action is based on information or

evidence known to the Government when the action is
brought. No action may be brought when the Government is
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already a party in the case. No action may be brought

based on public disclosure, transactions in a criminal
hearing, civil hearing, administrative hearing, or from

the news media, unless the action is brought by the

Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an
original source of the information.

Tiny person fired, demoted, suspended, threatened,

harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in

terms of his employment by his employer due to legal
actions taken with regard to the False Claims Act,

shall

be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee
whole. This relief shall include reinstatement at the same
level, two times the back pay plus interest and

compensation for any special costs sustained. This

includes any legal fees and costs.

Rules and Procedures
Civil action brought under the False Claims Act may
not be made more than six years after the date the

violation occurred, or an action may not be made more than

three years after the date the facts of the case are known
or should have been known by an official of the

responsible for taking action, but in no case may an
action be made ten years after the violation has occurred
(which ever occurs first). Any case brought under the
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False Claims Act, the United States is required to prove
all elements of the cause, including damages, by a

preponderance of the evidence. The rules listed are a

summary and not inclusive.

Civil Investigative Demands

The Attorney General may demand, when a person is
believed to possess material or information, the

information be produced. The individual must when ordered
provide written answers to questions involving the
material or information and give testimony concerning the

material or information. The demands for the material or

information shall include a statement of the nature of the

conduct constituting the alleged violation of the False
Claims Act. The material or information required must be
described with sufficient definiteness to permit the

material to be fairly identified. The questions,

for which

the answers are to be provided, must be in the form of
written interrogatories. And any person required to give

testimony shall be notified of the right to have an

attorney present. The civil investigative demands

discussed are not inclusive.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY

Design of the Investigation

The design of the investigation will be to utilize
the federal and state of California's False Claims Acts'

case reviews included to analyze the Caltrans'
construction claims process. Additionally, to review the

organizational structure at Caltrans to ascertain if the

claims made are being handled in the most efficient and
cost effective way given the organizations resources

available. Finally, the analysis will review if using the

legal history of the False Claims Acts can benefit the
organization as a cost savings tool for arbitrations on

construction disputes and claims.

The Caltrans' construction claims, arbitration
reviews and the organizational charts will be studied in
detail to provide background to complete an analysis on
the usefulness of the legislation for the organization.
Many variables will be identified throughout the

investigation, including procedures already in place
within the organization and prior legal remedies that the •

courts have adjudicated.
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Population

The principal characteristics of the population under

review are the general or primary contractors that obtain
contracts from Caltrans. Also involved are subcontractors,
whom although they do not directly have a contract with

the organization may also benefit from the state and
federally funded highway projects that the organization

inspects and administers.
The sampling of the population will be a quasi-

experimental in design in that there will be questions

asked of participants but they will be in an interview
format and as such will not necessarily be identical for

each participant. Additionally, most of the analysis will

be based on historical cost figures as there is always
time needed to gather and analyze the information provided

by the organization.

Treatment
The instruments used to gather the research are
varied and consist of phone conversations, one-on-one

interviews, powerpoint presentations,

Internet research,

legal research and literature reviews. Also used is the

Governor's budget for the financial component of the
Caltrans' construction budget and the STIP for the time
line component of the analysis. Attorney's fees and
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workload analysis will be used to ascertain the cost

incurred to the organization to prosecute alleged false
claims under the legislation.

The validity of the instruments will be difficult to
ascertain since they have not been studied in detail by

other researchers at this time. Other researchers and
attorneys have reviewed the False Claims legislation and
they are included to speak to the validity of the work.

Data Analysis Procedures

The procedures used to gather the data are different
for each data source. Data gathered on the case reviews

may be supplied by legal research organizations such as
the Taxpayers Against Fraud or by attorney's statements on

cases defended and prosecuted. All results will be

verified as possible with the US Attorney General's and
the Department of Justice's statistics for federal cases.

For state of California cases the Attorney General's
office has been consulted for data. Additionally data has
been gathered from newspaper accounts, publications and

Internet sites on case studies.

Data on construction claims has been gathered from
the organizations itself. Caltrans' records and
presentations will be used in the analysis. Published
documents like organization charts will be used in this
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capacity also. The organizations' Intranet capabilities
will be used to access additional data sources

and electronic files)

(i.e. forms

as warranted.

The data analysis procedures include calculations on
the number of false claims both federally and at the state

level which have been prosecuted. Judgements are reviewed
to ascertain cost analysis for cases concluded.

Construction statistics from the state are summarized to

show levels of claims made.

Additional data analysis will be performed on Dispute
Review Board statistics. DRB summaries are used to show
claims contested at the state level. Calculations are made

to determine the percentage of favorable outcomes at the
state level from the DRB cases. Illustrative charts and

graphs are included from calculations of relevant

statistics.

32

CHAPTER FOUR
CASE LAW

Constitutionality Case Law
In Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital

Oct. 21,

(S.D. Tex.

1997), a Texas District Court ruled the qui tam

provisions of the False Claims Act were unconstitutional.
This decision was contradictory to many years of court
decisions regarding constitutionality of the False Claims

Act. According to the Judge in the case, Congress cannot

"confer standing upon a qui tam plaintiff who has suffered
no cognizable injury under Article III of the Constitution

.

.

. consistent with principles of 'separation of

powers.'"

(12:1)

The district court analysis included a

description of the constitutional requirements for

standing. Quoting three elements of standing under Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555

(1992) :

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in
fact" — an invasion of a legally protected interest which
is

(a) concrete and particularized, and (b)

"actual or

imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.''' Second,

there must be a causal connection between the injury and

the conduct complained of ... Third, it must be "likely " as
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opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be

"redressed by a favorable decision."

Additionally, the court decided that "prudential
requirements also bear on standing." Therefore, according
to the court a plaintiff must "assert his own legal rights

and interests and not those of third parties."

(35:3)

The Texas District Court based its' decision on
a critique and rejection of the 9th Circuit's analysis and

holding in U.S. ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co. 9 F.3d 743

(9th Cir. 1993), which up held the constitutionality of

the qui tam provisions based on the assignment theory. The
assignment theory is that the Government may assign its'
interest in the case to a "relator", through the False

Claims Act.

"First, the district court rejected the Kelly court's

finding that, in addition to the Government as "the real
party in interest" meeting the injury requirement, the
relator also meet it by having a personal stake in the
outcome of the suit. While the Kelly court found that the
relator must "fund the prosecution of the suit," he is
eligible to receive "a sizeable bounty if he prevails,"

and "may be liable for costs if the suit is found to be
frivolous," the district court rejected these as merely

"byproducts" of the litigation that fail to evidence
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injury in fact."

(35:3) The Texas District Court also

determined the assignment theory assumes Congress assigned

the Government's interest and injury to a qui tam relator
fails for three reasons. The first being there was "no

indication in the statute that Congress was attempting to

bestow a contract right to recover damages on the qui tam

plaintiffs, who were not even identified at the time of
passage, and are not identifiable until they themselves
initiate a suit." Second to effectively assign a contract

right, "the owner of that right must manifest an intention
to make a present transfer of the right without further

action by the owner or by the obligor." However, according
to the Texas District Court, Congress is not given the

power to prosecute fraud cases. Based on the
Constitutional separation of powers, "Congress is

powerless to distribute powers that it does not have".
Additionally,

common law does not allow assignment of in

the future rights as recognizable. "There must be a
'present transfer of an existing right'". Third,

permitting relators to suit on behalf of the Government
"would effectively permit Congress to circumvent...standing
assigning a governmental cause of action to an individual.
"The court found that, in light of standing being an
integral part of our system of separation of powers,

35

Congress should not be allowed to legislatively circumvent

Article Ill's standing requirements".

(35:4)

The Texas District Court also rejected precedence in
previous False Claims Act cases which upheld

constitutionality of "Congress simply extended the Article
III standing to [relators] under the statute" by creating
a legal interest in the statute and conferring the

standing to assert it. The Texas District Court stated the
Supreme Court has rejected theory that a statutory right
eliminates the need for "injury in fact." "Injury in fact
is not a prudential requirement that can be discarded by

passage of legislation, and the Article III inquiry cannot

turn on the source of the asserted right."

(35:4)

The

Texas District Court also discounted Supreme Court dicta

presumably approving of the qui tam provisions,

finding

that it predated the "Courts modern conception of

standing." The long history of the qui tam provisions did
not persuade the court, as proof of its'

constitutionality. The Texas District Court stated that
"Article Ill's requirements are clear,

and are not to be

avoided by courts eager to uphold the constitutionality of

congressional enactments."

(35:4)

"In short, the district court concluded that the

relator suffered no injury in fact nor did she show any
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'causal' link between an injury (even if there were one)
and the conduct complained of. Further,

'Congress cannot

statutorily assign the Executive's future interest in

pursuing a particular fraud claim to an unnamed
theoretical plaintiff.' Otherwise, Congress would

'circumvent Article III standing requirements, which are
essential to the principle of a limited judicial role

under our separation of powers.'"

(36:18)

Another Texas District Court disagreed with the

unconstitutionality of the qui tam provision of the False
Claims Act in U. S. ex rel.

Thompson v.

Columbia / HCA

Healthcare Corp, et al., Order, Civil Action No.
(S.D.

C-95-110

Tex. Aug. 18, 1998). The court rejected the

defendant's assertion that the qui tam provision of the
False Claims Act was unconstitutional. The "relator James

Thompson, M.D., alleged that Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corporation and certain affiliated entities created

incentive arrangements and provided financial inducements
to physicians for patient referrals in violation of the

anti-kickback statute and self-referral laws."

(36:18)

The

court first considered the constitutionality of the qui
tam provisions. The court decided contrary to a decision

reached earlier that year in the same district by another
court. This court disagreed with the ruling in Riley v.
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St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital, "’because it goes against
134 years of case law specifically concluding or assuming
that the qui tam provisions are constitutional and/or that

the relator has standing to bring the action even though
the relator has suffered no injury.' The court instead

concurred with the numerous circuit courts that have
addressed the issue and found the qui tam provisions to be

constitutional. Citing other circuit decisions, the court

noted that where the Government has suffered an injury-in
fact, the relator merely steps in as its representative or
assignee to carry out the statute's purpose of remedying

fraud against the Government. Moreover, the FCA provides

sufficient executive control of the qui tam suit and the
relator has a personal stake in the outcome of his suit.

The court also observed that ’appellate courts scrutinize

their jurisdiction before reviewing the issues of each
case, and none, including the Supreme Court,

in ruling on

FCA cases has yet determined that it lacked jurisdiction

because an FCA qui tam relator lacked standing.'"

(36:18)

Again in U.S. ex rel. Olloh-Okeke v. Home Care
Services Inc. a " Texas district court denied the

defendants' motion to dismiss Clara Olloh-Okeke's qui tam

suit on constitutional..." (21:16) This court, explicitly
rejected the Texas court's ruling in U.S. ex rel. Riley v.
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St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital, 982 F.Supp. 1261

(S.D.Tex.

1997), and instead relied on the opinion by Judge Harmon
in U.S. ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA, 20 F.Supp.2d

1017, 1044-46 (S.D.Tex. 1998), stating that "[ t] his
court joins Judge Harmon and every other federal appellate

court that has considered the issue in disagreeing with
Riley because it goes against 134 years of case law
specifically concluding or assuming that the qui tam

provisions are constitutional."

(41:16) And once again in

Hopkins v. Actions, Incorporated of Brazoria County, 1997
WL 789429 (S.D.

Tex. Dec. 19, 1997) another Texas district

court "held that a plaintiff need not have standing as a
relator to utilize the FCA § 3730(h)

retaliation

provision. Furthermore, in an express rejection of its own

district's recent decision in U.S. ex rel. Riley v. St.
Luke's Episcopal Hospital, the court alternatively held

that the plaintiff did have constitutional standing as a
relator. The court stated "In light of the congressional

purpose underlying the FCA and its plain language, this
court rejects the St. Luke's reasoning. Moreoever, a close

reading of Robertson reveals that the Fifth Circuit finds
the standing question to be a non-issue on these facts.

Indeed,

in one of the few cases addressing the standing of

a qui tam plaintiff, the Fifth Circuit
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(in U.S.

ex rel.

Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc., 557 F.2d 456, 460

1977))

(5th Cir.

described the FCA as a statute that 'grants

informers standing to sue and an award for successful

action under the statute.'"
In U.S.

(21:16)

ex rel. Fallon et al. v. Accudyne Corp, and

Alliant Techsystems, Inc., the defendants argued that the

relators again lacked standing because the controversy was

between the United States and the defendants. The relators
had not suffered injury in fact. The defendants also

argued again that the qui tam provisions of the False

Claims Act violated the separation of powers' principles.

The defendants also argued, the Appointments Clause of
Article II commands that the President "shall take care
that the laws be faithfully executed." Lastly, the

defendants cited a case which held that private attorneys
appointed 'must be personally disinterested in criminal

prosecution. Therefore, the defendants claimed that the
due process clause is violated by permitting private
citizens with an interest in the outcome of the proceeding
to prosecute claims on behalf of the United States. The
court disagreed with each of the arguments,

finding that

standing was not at issue since the real party in interest

was the United States, which simply assigned its right to
sue to the relators. Further, since relators were
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advancing their own funds in prosecution of the suit and
were entitled to receive a share of any recovery, there

was "a direct and adversarial controversy" between
relators and defendants. With respect to the Appointment
Clause of Article II, the court found that, given the

substantial control the Government retains over a
relator's action, executive power is not improperly

usurped and relators are not vested with sufficient
authority to be deemed "officers of the United States."

And finally with respect to a possible violation of the

due process clause, the court again rejected the argument,

stating "the cited authority involved criminal

(not civil)

prosecutions and did not suggest that appointing a

prosecutor with an interest in the litigation's outcome
rose to the level of a due process violation." (21-:16)
In U.S.

ex rel. Fallon et al. v. Accudyne Corp, and

Alliant Techsystems, Inc., the defendants also argued that
since the case involved alleged no compliance with

environment provisions of the contract, the violations did

not threaten a financial interest. The district court also
rejected the defendants' argument that the suit "was not
supportable because the U.S. was not exposed to any

financial risk as a result of Accudyne's alleged failure
to comply with the environmental compliance provisions.
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The court stated:

'If such provisions are to have effect

their knowing violation must have the potential to support

FCA claims even though violations do not threaten a
financial interest. Accordingly,

courts have consistently

held that damage to the financial interests of the

government is not a prerequisite to a FCA claim.'"

(21:16)

However, in U.S. ex red. Minnesota Association of

Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health System Corp, et al.,
Opinion and Order, No.

4-96-734

(D. Minn. March 16, 1999),

"a Minnesota district court ruled that a relator lacks

constitutional standing where the Government has not
suffered economic damages. According to the court, if the

Government has not suffered economic injury,

it does not

satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for Article III
standing,

and therefore has no standing to assign to a qui

tam relator."

(36:1)

The Supreme Court decided two constitutional issues
in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v.

Stevens, 120 S.Ct. 1858

U.S. ex rel.

(May 22, 2000). The first was

whether or not a qui tam relator can suit

(has standing)

on behalf of the United States. And second whether or not

a State can be considered a "person" and a defendant in a

false claims suit.
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The Court unanimously ruled that the relator,
Stevens, met Article Ill's standing requirements. Article
III of the U. S. Constitution, requires a plaintiff must

establish "an injury-in-fact. This injury-in-fact must be

"concrete" and "actual or imminent". It can not be of
conjectural or hypothetical basis. Additionally the
causation must be fairly traceable, with a connection

between the injury-in-fact and the conduct of the
defendant. Also,

in order for there to be standing, there

must be redressability. Redressability is a substantial

likelihood that the requested relief will remedy the
plaintiff's injury. Stevens argued and the court agreed

that his qui tam suit provided remedy for injury suffered
by the United States. The court found the injury to the

United States sovereignty, due to violation of its'

law

and alleged fraud injured the United States proprietarily

Regarding the assignment and recovery by the relator
Stevens, "The Court also found that the portion of the

Government's recovery Stevens could receive upon

prevailing constituted a concrete private interest in the
outcome of the suit. Stating, however, that "[ t] he

interest must consist of obtaining compensation for, or
preventing, the violation of a legally protected right,"

the Court stressed that the concrete interest must be
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related to the injury-in-fact. As Stevens' right to his
share of the Government's recovery could not fully

materialize until the litigation was over, this interest
would be merely a "byproduct" of the suit and would not
serve to obtain compensation for or prevent a violation to
a legally protected right."
t

(39:2) Additionally, the

Supreme Court found adequate basis for standing by Stevens

as relator,

and the assignment theory. The court stated

the False Claims Act

"can reasonably be regarded as

effecting a partial assignment of the Government's damages
claim."

(39:2)

In making it's ruling the "Court heavily

relied upon the qui tam concept's grounding in English and
American legal history. The Court stated:

[H] istory is

particularly relevant to the constitutional standing
inquiry since ..Article Ill's restriction of the judicial

power to "Cases" and "Controversies" is properly

understood to mean "cases and controversies of the sort
traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial

process." The Court observed that qui tam actions in
various forms have been a part of English legal tradition

since the end of the 13th century, when private
individuals sued to vindicate royal interests as well as
their own. The Court also recognized the qui tam tradition
in the American legal system, noting particularly its use
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immediately before and after the framing of the

Constitution. Referring to qui tarn's historical roots, the
Court concluded its analysis of this issue by stating-:

"When combined with the theoretical justification for

relator standing discussed earlier, it leaves no room for
doubt that a qui tam relator under the FCA has Article III

standing."

(39:2)

Regarding the issue of whether or not a State is a
"person" and can be held liable under the False Claims
Act, the Supreme Court decided in a split decision that:

"a state or state agency is not a "person" subject to qui

tam liability under § 3729 of the False Claims Act."

(39:4)

The False Claims Act states "[ a]ny person who

knowingly presents or causes to be presented, to an
officer or employee of the United States Government ... a

false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval." And
the Court, looking- at a "longstanding presumption that the

term person does not include the sovereign, the Court

found no affirmative showing of congressional intent to
the contrary in the FCA. The Court stated-:

'The

presumption is particularly applicable where it is claimed
that Congress subjected the States to liability to which

they had not been subject before.' According to the Court,

the FCA as originally enacted in 1863 'bore no indication
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that States were subject to its penalties' and none of the

subsequent amendments to the statute, including the 1986
amendments,

suggested a broadening of the term person."

(39:5). The Supreme Court supported it's findings using
three aspects of the False Claims Act language. First, the

language requires the Attorney General to investigate

demands to "any person" with information regarding a False
Claims Act violation. In this case the language expands

the definition of "any person" to include states, while
the False Claims Act liability provisions contain no
reference to states being included as "any person".

Second, the Court interpreted the False Claims Act as
"essentially punitive in nature," therefore cannot be

imposed on government entities. And third, prior to the
1-986 Amendment to the False Claims Act the Program Fraud

Civil Remedies Act

(PFCRA) was enacted which specifically

does not include states as subject to liability. The
Supreme Court stated it would be "most peculiar" to
"subject states to the damages and penalties provisions of

the False Claims Act while exempting them from the smaller
damages imposed under the PFCRA. The Court found further

support for its holding in two doctrines of statutory
construction. The Court applied the ordinary rule of
statutory construction known as the clear statement rule,
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which holds that 'if Congress intends to alter the usual

constitutional balance between States and the Federal
Government, it must make its intention to do so

unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.'
Reiterating its finding that Congress did not manifest
such an intent in the FCA, the Court moved on to the

second doctrine, which holds that 'statutes should be

construed so as to avoid difficult constitutional
questions.' Of this the Court stated-:

'We of course

express no view on the question whether an action in
federal court by a qui tam relator against a State would
run afoul of the Eleventh Amendment, but we note that

there is

'serious doubt' on that score.'" (39:3)

Two dissenting votes by Justices Stevens'and Souter
disagreed that a State could not be considered a "person"
in a qui tam lawsuit. In their opinion they stated "[t]he

False Claims Act is ... all-embracing in scope, national in

its purpose, and as capable of being violated by state as
by individual action." "...when Congress uses" persons "...in
federal statutes enforceable by the Federal Government or
by a federal agency,

it applies to States and state

agencies as well as to private individuals and
corporations."

(39:3)
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While the Supreme Court concluded that an individual
in a qui tam action cannot sue a state, the Court did not

decided decide whether or not a suit could be brought by

the United States against a state. Justice Ginsburg stated

"the clear statement rule applied to private suits against
a State has not been applied when the United States is the

plaintiff." therefore "I read the Court's decision to

leave open the question whether the word 'person'

encompasses States when the United States itself sues

under the False Claims Act."

(39:5)

Also unresolved, by the Supreme Court is whether or
not municipalities, municipal agencies, counties and other

local government entities can be considered "persons" and
liable under the False Claims Act. Additionally, no
resolution was made whether a State or local "proprietary"
or "independent" entity can be sued and whether or not

State or other government employees can be sued as
"persons" under the False Claims Act.

Public Disclosure Bare and Original
Source Case Law

Section 3730 of the False Claims Act requires the

relator to be the original source of false claim
information in a qui tam suit, and the information can not
be disclosed publicly previous to the suit. In U.S.
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ex

rel. Grayson et al. v. Advanced Management Technology et

al., the 4th Circuit court dismissed the case based on

both, that the relator was not the original source and the

false claim information was previously disclosed publicly.
In this case the false claim information was derived from
an administrative complaint previously filed with the FAA

by an unsuccessful bidder of the government contract. The

court also held the relator "Grayson and Hoffman", who

were acting as attorneys for the Camber Corporation were
not the original source and the information provided by

others was insufficient as "direct" and "independent"
knowledge as required by the statute.

(41:1)

In U.S. ex rel. Hansen v. Cargill, Inc. et al., the

Shell Oil Litigation Settlement Trustee Committee
purchased 10,000 acres in the San Francisco North Bay area
(known as the Napa Salt Marshes)

for $10 million. The

purchase was a litigation settlement for environmental
preservation. The relator, Hansen, filed the suit against

Cargill Inc., and its appraisers stating Cargill Inc.,
defrauded the United States by submitting a $34 million

public interest value on the land. Hansen asserted the
land had a negative value due to environmental clean up
that would be necessary at the Napa Salt Marshes. The

California district court ruled the relator did not have
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"direct knowledge" and did not meet the original source

requirements of the False Claims Act, because the
information presented had been publicly disclosed by the
news media. The court made this ruling while acknowledging
the relator had been the source of the disclosure to the

media.

(41:2) .

In U.S.

ex rel. Coleman v. State of Indiana et al.,

an Indiana district court decided that the public

disclosure bar of the False Claims Act included state
administrative proceedings and hearings. The court
dismissed the case stating his was not the original
source, since the Indiana General Assembly, Administrative

Rules Oversight Committee met and discussed a similar

compliant previous to the Coleman suit.
In U.S.

ex rel. Downy v.

Corning, Inc.

et al., a New

Mexico district court ruled in favor of the relator and

that a general public discussion did not meet the public

disclosure bar. "The court ruled that the disclosure did
not trigger the bar pursuant to the test established in
U.S.

ex rel. Springfield terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14

F.3d 645, 654

(D.C. Cir. 1994), which held that Congress

intended to prohibit qui tam actions "only when either the

allegations of fraud or the critical elements of the

fraudulent transaction themselves
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[are] in the public

domain."

In Downy the New Mexico court decided the

(41:4)

general public discussion did not disclose the allegations
of fraud, but only involved questions of policy. "The

relator's complaint was not ’based upon' the public

disclosure despite the fact that it involved the same
general subject matter."

(41:4)

Government Intervention Case Law
In U.S.

ex rel. Newsham and Bloem v. Lockheed

Missiles and Space Company, Inc. r the 11th Circuit Court

Stated "once a qui tam suit is filed, the Government has
sixty days to choose one of only two options: to intervene
and proceed with the action, or to decline intervention.

If the Government elects the former, it may control the

prosecution of the case, subject to the relator 's right
to continue as a party and to obtain a hearing and court

approval regarding any settlement or dismissal of the
action."

(21:12)

In this case "the relator's share is 15

to 25 percent of the recovery. On the other hand, if the

Government chooses to decline, the relator has the right
to conduct the action subject to the Government's right to

intervene at a later date upon a showing of good cause,
and the relator is entitled to 25 to 30 percent of the

recovery." However in this case the court found "The
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government has from the beginning flagrantly and
repeatedly violated the provisions of the statute." To

begin with, the Government failed either to intervene or

notify the court of its declination to do so within sixty
days of its receipt of the complaint, and, "[w]ithout
under-taking either of these authorized alternatives, the

government succeeded in having Williams' complaint
erroneously dismissed on a jurisdictional issue." Second,
"in flagrant disregard of the statute," the Government did

not seek leave of court to intervene or make a showing of

good cause before settling with NEC. Finally, the

Government failed either to notify Williams of the
settlement or to seek court approval for it. "In settling
with NEC, the government brazenly ignored both Williams'
right to a hearing and the statutory prerequisite of court

authorization." The 11th Circuit also "held that the FCA
does not contain a general prohibition against government

employees filing qui tam suits and that the §3730(e)(4)
public disclosure bar did not apply to Williams' lawsuit."
(21:13)
The Government in the case "argued that the court did

not have jurisdiction to award Williams a statutory share
of the settlement because the Government was not a 'party'
to the action. The Government further argued that Williams
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had no entitlement because the facts of the case did not

fall into either of the qui tam recovery provisions set
out in §3730(d). That is,

(d)(1) was inapplicable because

the Government did not 'proceed with [the] action,' and
(d)(2) was inapplicable because Williams did not 'collect

the civil penalty and damages.'"

(21:13)

The Government

also maintained that its settlement with NEC was not a
settlement of Williams'

qui tam action. And that Williams

had not make the case that the settlement included the
claims in his complaint. "The 11th Circuit characterized

the Government's arguments as 'specious' and as an attempt

'to take advantage of its blatant violations of the
statute.'" (21:13)

The court ruled that the Government's settlement with
NEC was an "intervention" in the lawsuit within the

meaning of the FCA. Further, the settlement effectively

terminated the lawsuit, except for the determination of

Williams' statutory compensation of between 15 and 25

percent (as well as attorneys' fees and expenses). The
court ruled that Williams was entitled to 15 percent of
the $34 million settlement. "While noting that the

district court generally determines the relator's exact
percentage, the 11th Circuit concluded that it should

determine the relator's share on the record before it

53

'[i]n light of Williams' death and the government's head
in the sand, arbitrariness in opposing Williams' efforts

to preserve his testimony."

(21:13)

California's False Claims Act
Twelve states nationwide as of 2003 have False Claims

Legislation. These are: Nevada, Hawaii, Texas, Washington,
Louisiana, Arkansas, Florida, Tennessee, Virginia,
Massachusetts, Illinois and California

(22:2). The

California Law was enacted in 1987. The law is similar to
the federal legislation that it was modeled from, but is

designed to protect the state of California not the
federal government (6:1).

When the law was passed, there was a perception that
there was an increase in fraud at the state and local
government levels and that this legislation would protect

the state. The California legislation addresses false
claims against the state or any political subdivision.
"This is the most important aspect of the California Act:

that claims brought on behalf of such entities as city and
county governments, public schools and colleges, and
special transportation districts may all be brought under

the Act’s provisions (26:4). The legislature meant for
this to have the broadest possible construction to benefit

the public interest.
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Although modeled, after the federal legislation there
are some significant differences between them (11:101).
The California False Claims Act includes local public

funds and can involve both state and local programs.

the California False Claims Act is not

Additionally,

exclusive, thereby allowing other legal remedies to be
sought (28:3).

The federal government has benefited enormously from
the federal False Claims Act. In 1992,

for example, a

settlement was reached in a qui tam whistleblower case
that recovered $110 million from National Health

Laboratories

(NHL). NHL had billed the Medicare program

for medically unnecessary tests. The case was initiated

when an employee of a competitor’s lab tipped off the

government through a qui tam whistleblower notice to the
attorney general. The ensuing investigation of NHL
revealed irregular billing practices from other
laboratories as well, and a four-year examination of the
independent laboratories turned up $800 million in damages

and penalties. When the federal government announced

completion of a settlement with the Healthcare Corporation
of America, the largest operator of private hospitals in

the country, bringing the total recovery from that

company, including penalties and sanctions, to almost $2
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billion. (1:3). That case started with a private complaint
of the type that the whistleblower act so appropriately

encourages,

this outcome is the type that California

legislators hope to achieve.

Although the California law lay dormant for most of
the 1980s, in the 1990s the public sector felt inundated
by a barrage of unjustified claims and began to use the

California False Claims Act as a defensive measure

(42:2).

In a case regarding Toshiba, the office of the Attorney

General recently recovered $1.7 million from a vendor who

used false documents to defraud the state in a computer
purchase

(29:1). In another CFCA case, the Deputy City

Attorney in San Francisco was the lead Deputy on the case
of Stull v. Bank of America — a major false claims

tarn)

(qui

lawsuit against the bank on behalf of San Francisco

and 300 other municipal entities. This case resulted in a

settlement of $200 million. This is the largest settlement
in history under California’s False Claims Act

"California's attorney general,

(3:3).

for example, is

investigating fraud in a wide range of government
programs; prison construction projects are particularly

ripe for fraud. Construction vendors in California have

been known to substitute inferior products and fail to
provide promised equipment

(29:1)".
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It is not unusual for public-project subcontractors

and second-tier suppliers to write off such laws on the
theory that they are not providing labor or materials
directly to a governmental body and, therefore, they are
not submitting claims for payment to a governmental body.
As demonstrated in City of Pomona v. Superior Court,

Cal. App. 4th 793

89

(2001), however, contractors and

suppliers do not need a direct contractual relationship
with a governmental body to be found liable under a False

Claims Act.
In City of Pomona, a supplier in California sold

piping and other water distribution parts through

catalogues provided to distributors. In its catalogues,
the supplier represented that its products complied with

certain industry corrosion standards. In 1991, without

modifying the representations in its catalogues, the
supplier began selling piping and other parts that failed

to meet these corrosion standards.
Over the next six years, the City of Pomona purchased

the supplier's products from a distributor through the

supplier's catalogues. After the city learned that the
catalogues' representations concerning compliance with
industry standards were false, the city brought an action
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against the supplier for allegedly violating the

California False Claims Act

("the Act").

At trial, the court found no violation of the Act,
holding that the city had failed to prove the supplier

submitted a false claim because the supplier’s false
representations were made generally in its catalogues, not
specifically within the city’s purchase orders or the

distributors' invoices to the city. Upon dismissal of its
action, the city appealed the trial court's ruling to the

California Court of Appeals.

The appellate court rejected the trial court's
decision and restored the city's action. Noting that
California's Act is based on the federal False Claims Act,
the court first concluded that, like the federal Act,

California's Act was intended to reach all types of fraud
that might result in financial loss to government. To

violate the Act, a claim submitted to a governmental

entity need not be false itself so long as it is
underpinned by fraud. Therefore, according to the court, a
person may be liable for presenting a false claim for

payment under the Act even though the person did not
directly apply for or obtain any government funds.
The court then considered and rejected the supplier's

defense that it was not liable under the Act because it
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had no knowledge that the city would be the end user of

products it supplied to its distributors. The court found
that, because the supplier intended to attract customers
such as the city with its catalogues and sales literature,
the supplier was liable for the fruits of its marketing.

In the court's eyes, no other finding would serve the

purposes of the Act.
Finally, examining the circumstances presented in

City of Pomona, the appellate court held that, by taking
orders for the materials advertised in its catalogues and

supplying distributors with such materials for purchase by
the city, the supplier caused its distributors to submit

false claims for payment to the city. The court reasoned
that the distributors' claims were false for two reasons.
First, the city would not have entered into a contract

with the distributors to buy the supplier's products had
it known that the supplier's products did not meet

industry standards. Second, while the distributors billed
the city for products the city ordered from the
catalogues, the products that the city received and paid
for did not match the specifications in those catalogues.

Although City of Pomona deals specifically with

California's False Claims Act, there is good reason to
believe that other states, particularly those whose laws
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are based on the federal Act, would also construe their
laws to extend liability to persons or entities that have
no contractual relationship with, or do not directly

present claims to, a governmental body. Accordingly,

contractors and suppliers who indirectly furnish services
or materials to public bodies need to be as careful about

submitting claims for payment as though they were

submitting such claims to the government itself.
In 1997, the legislature amended the California False

Claims Act with Assembly Bill 2678 written by Figueroa
(29:3). This amendment limits the privilege areas. This
amendment will create a more powerful weapon in fighting

claims fraud.
In addition to the California False Claims Act being

modeled after the federal legislation a new California
insurance fraud law is also modeled after the federal
False Claims Act. "In what is being called a landmark

fraud decision" a California jury ordered payment of 8.2

million dollars to Allstate Insurance Company from a group
of doctors and clinics accused of false billing practices

(47:1) .
"A July 1996 Court of Appeals decision, Stacy &

Witbeck, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco,
App. 4th 1,

54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530
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47 Cal.

(1996) held that the

litigation privilege does not apply to protect statements

made in the contract claim submission process. In that

case, Stacy and Witbeck was a contractor to the City of
San Francisco on a municipal project. Stacy and Witbeck
was encouraged by the City engineering staff to submit

documentation in support of its claims,

in anticipation of

settlement discussions. Stacy and Witbeck submitted the
documentation, the claims were denied, and the contractor
filed litigation. The City contended that the claims

submitted were false, and filed a cross-complaint against
the contractor alleging violation of the False Claims Act
and seeking treble damages and other penalties. Stacy and

Witbeck sought dismissal of the cross-complaint on the

grounds that the claims submission process was undertaken
in anticipation of litigation,

and was therefore

privileged. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that,

while one purpose of the contract claims submission was
anticipation of litigation,

the litigation privilege did

not apply because there was an independent purpose,

i.e.

Stacy and Witbeck's compliance with the contract
requirements. The effect of this case was to strip the

contractor from immunity for False Claim liability for

statements and claims made in the course of a contractual
claims submission procedure"

(29:7).

61

In an interesting California case, LeVine v Weis
(1998), a teacher at a Ventura County juvenile home school

facility was terminated from his employment. LeVine, the

teacher felt that this arose due to his complaints that
the school site was understaffed and as a result he wound
up responsible for 90 to 120 students. The jury found

Weis, the County Superintendent of Schools liable for
violation of the False Claims Act.

The jury awarded

LeVine $350,000 for emotional distress,

$86,158 for lost

back pay and $50,000 for other economic loss. The trial
court doubled the award of back pay and added interest

pursuant to section 12653, subdivision (c). The total

award was $627,207. Also given to the plaintiff was
$241,975 for attorney's and court fees

(41:3). This is

significant in that it demonstrates the level of relief

awarded and also allows that the Superintendent (a public

entity employee) was a person as defined by the act.

Construction Contracts, Relevant Case Law
In the case of the United States versus Azzarelli

Construction Company in 1981 the defendants allegedly

rigged a bid on a state highway project. The case involved
a federal act under which the United States contributed a

fixed sum to each state for highway construction. The
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court held that the defendants did not present a claim
’upon or against the government of the United States.

"The

court reasoned that even if the defendants defrauded a
federal grantee, the federal government contributed

nothing more to the state as a result"

(33,

4). Since the

state and not the federal government suffered the fraud

this case was dismissed.
In United States ex rel. Ashol Bhatnagar v. Kiewit

Pacific Co., State of California, Department of
Transportation, a U.S. District Court for Northern

California dismissed the case. The False Claims Act
relator, Ashok Bhatnagar, sued both entities based on

claims made by Kiewit to the Department of Transportation

(Caltrans), paid by the Caltrans, submitted by Caltrans
for Federal reimbursement, and for retaliation by Caltrans

toward Bhatnagar.

Bhatnagar argued the claim submitted by Kiewit for
stormwater protection cost should not have been paid as

extra work to the original contract, because the original

contract included providing stormwater protection.
Bhatnagar quoted the contract special provisions, which
stated the cost for providing stormwater protection

measures were included in the contract and that no
additional compensation would be provided for the costs.
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Bhatnagar also argued that Caltrans submitted these costs

for federal reimbursement as traffic control work and
Caltrans retaliated against him for "whistleblowing". The
federal government did not join in the suit against Kiewit

or Caltrans.
The District Court decided that since the California

Regional Water Quality Board mandated more stringent
control of stormwater runoff after the contract had been
signed, the claim was not a false claim issue but a

contract dispute issue. The court also decided that since
Caltrans was a state entity,

it was not liable for

submitting the cost for federal reimbursement under the
False Claims Act, nor liable regarding the False Claims

Act provision regarding retaliation. The District Court
based its' decision on Vermont Agency of Natural Resources

v.

United States ex rel. Stevens, where the Supreme Court

held states are not liable under the False Claims Act in
actions by private individuals. The District Court
expanded on Stevens, in that states are not liable
regarding the provisions of retaliation in the False

Claims Act (34:1).
In U.S. ex rel. Shaw v. AAA Engineering & Drafting,

Inc. et al., a 10th Circuit court found the defendant
liable under the False Claims Act for not complying with
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the environmental requirements of the contract. In a

contract with the Tinker Air Force Base, AAA Engineering &
Drafting,

Inc. agreed to provide photographer services.

The contract required the photographic operations to
provide an Environmental Protection Agency regulation for

disposal of film processing solution. AAA was required to
remove all traces of silver from the solution prior to
disposal. The suit alleged AAA did not perform the silver

recovery, yet invoiced for full payment of the contract.
AAA argued they only billed for the fixed price of the

contract, there was no misrepresentation and therefore
could not be held liable for fraudulent billing. "The
court found, however, that ASA had implied certification

with each monthly invoice that it complied with the silver
recovery provisions of its contract with the Government.

The court reasoned that because the contract required AAA
to practice silver recovery in its laboratory, AAA was

being paid not only for photography services but also for
environmental compliance."

(41:7)

The court held that by

falsely certifying (with the monthly billing) A7A had
express or implied compliance. "The court cited to a
statement by the Senate Judiciary Committee at the time of

the amendments:

'[A false claim under the FCA] may take

many forms, the most common being a claim for goods and
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services not provided, or provided in violation of
contract terms, specification, statute, or regulation.'"

(41:7) Additionally, "the court found that the language of
§ 3729(a) (1)

supports the theory of implied false

certification. Whereas § 3729(a)(2) premises liability on

the presentation of a 'false record or statement to get a

false or fraudulent claim paid or approved', liability

under the language of § 3720(a)(1) does not require
evidence of a false record or statement."

(41:8)

The court

admitted contradictory judgements in other cases, however
in this case AAA clearly knew they were not adhering to

the silver recovery requirements, yet submitted invoices
for full payment of the contract. And any negative
precedence could easily be differed from the facts in this

case. The defendant also argued that since the Government

had access to the work orders, the Government knew of the
failure to comply with the environmental requirements.

Therefore, there could be no fraud or intent to violate
the False Claims Act. The court acknowledged that when the

Governments knowledge is extensive, there could not be, as
a matter of law, the state of mind to warrant falsity in

the payment invoice. However, in this case there was not
extensive knowledge by the Government of the non-

compliance. And the Governments alleged acknowledge did
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not negate the evidence that AAA knowingly submitted false

billing based on full compliance of the contract.

(41:5)

California Superior Court judge Joseph Katlin found
in favor of the Los Angles Metropolitan Transportation

Authority (MTA) in a FCA case against Tutor-Saliba
Corporation. The construction contract, to build the

subway and subway stations, required numerous contract
change orders for ambiguities and omissions in the
contract plans and specifications. Many of the requests

for additional compensation for work in 1995 were made,

however Tutor-Saliba sued the MTA for 19.5 million dollars
in unpaid claims . The MTA responded with a FCA suit in

1999 and was awarded 29.5 million. The judge imposed
additional awards of 2.4 million and another 34 million

was litigated for legal fees

(33:3). The award was made

due to false submittals of bills for extra work,

lack of

cooperation in turning over bidding documentation and

improper listing of subcontractors

(41:1).

The MTA joined in on a FCA suit against Shea-KiewitKenny (SKK), requesting nearly $100 million in damages.
"The agency has accused SKK of improperly using low-grade

wooden wedges, which failed to meet strength requirements

specified in its contract, between segments of its

concrete tunnel linings". Additionally the MTA accused SKK
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of regularly filling spaces between tunnel liner segments
with trash, wood scraps and plaster. According to the

attorney for the relator Buffington, Shea-Kiewit-Kenny
(SKK)

"consistently sought more ways for billing money for

doing less"

(34:3). The MTA fired SKK in July of 1995,

when a portion of the Hollywood Boulevard over the tunnel
work sank into a large sinkhole. Buffington, an employee
of the contract management firm Parsons-Dillingham,

brought the FCA suit and the MTA joined in the action.

Buffington stated in an interview that he tried to tell
his bosses at Parsons-Dillingham and executives at the MTA
that SKK billed for work not completed and billed for
materials and equipment it never used. When they failed to

take legal action against the builder, Buffington decided
to file the FCA suit. "I was paid to ensure that taxpayers

got what they paid for..." said Buffington. "I asked myself
whether I could turn my head on wrongdoing,
was no."

(31:1)
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and my answer

CHAPTER FIVE
CALTRANS PREEXISTING MECHANISMS

Engineers and Contractors Debate over Contract
Change Orders

Contract change orders

(CCOs)

arise as an attachment

to contracts for many reasons. Common causes include a

change in contract plans, to authorize an increase or
decrease in contract work, to make adjustments in

compensation, to change the quantity of an item, to
compensate for delays to the contractor, or to make a
change in payment for changes in character of the work.
Caltrans has a preexisting, elaborate system for preparing

and using CCOs.
To begin a CCO the engineer must fill out a Form CEM4900 "Contract Change Order" and a Form CEM-4903 "Contract

Change Order Memorandum" for each change. These forms are

numbered and forwarded to the district office and are
entered into an electronic system for tracking.

Among the preliminary considerations to be made when
writing a CCO are necessity, impact, time and money.

Engineers should consult with the contractor when writing
a CCO to discuss all the elements of the change to avoid

conflict later in the construction process.
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The CCO should be clear, concise and explicit. Items
that should be included, if applicable are: what work is
to be done, the location and limits of the work, any

specification changes and reference to the manual, the

CCOs affect on the timeline of the job completion, and
method and amount of compensation for the CCO.
On the description of the work section of the CCO,

the engineer should be as specific as possible. Often
times a drawing or a copy of plans will be included with

the Form 4900 to illustrate the proposed change. All
attachments should show dimensions and calculations to

illustrate the change. Additionally all attached sheets

should reference the original contract number, the sheet

number and the CCO number.

For adjustments in compensation due to changes in the

character of the work or requirements of extra work, the
contractor is required to provide an estimate of the cost,

through a force account analysis. This will include a
detailed estimate of the hours for labor and equipment,
plus materials. Contract specified markups are also

included.
Increases and decreases on contract item are
occasionally required when errors in the contract's

"Engineers Estimate" is incorrect with respect the
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quantities of items of work. When this occurs the contract
allows 25% increase or decrease without change to the

original bid price for the item. If the increase or

decrease is greater than 25% then an adjustment in the
price of the item is made based on a force account
analysis of the work.

Occasionally delays caused by the state to the

contractor's work schedule occur. Analysis of the original
schedule submitted by the contractor, compared to the
delay caused by the state, will determine if and how much
compensation is due to the contractor. The delay must
impact the controlling items of work. The controlling

items of work are defined by the "critical path", which is
a sequential list of work items that must be completed to

finish the project. Delays caused by the state on items of
work which are not on the critical path do not delay the

completion of the project and therefore are not considered

delays to the project. Issues concerning the actual costs
of the delay, additional overhead costs, lost opportunity
costs, costs to subcontractor and suppliers, and so on,

are often raised by the contractor. The analysis of delays

caused by the state can be complex and the CCOs to handle
the additional compensation are often highly debated.
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The CCO follows a prescribed path throughout the
organization. At Caltrans there is a CCO desk at the

district level. New engineer's rotate through this

assignment for training purposes and review all CCOs on a
district-wide basis. CCOs of greater dollar or excessive
time require review,

in addition to the district level, by

the state department of transportation headquarters in

Sacramento. These serve as a second form of review after
the engineers'

first review of the CCO.

Dispute Review Boards
To ensure that the claim or contract change order

disputes are handled in a cost efficient manner the
organization has established dispute review boards

(DRBs).

The name is appropriate in that the purpose of the DRBs is
to review disputes between the contractor and Caltrans.

The thought process was that if DRBs were established
early in the project and kept apprised of the progress of
the project, they would be there to help as a neutral

third party when a dispute did arise.
The board is a panel of three experts, one appointed
by the state and one appointed by the contractor. These

two appointed positions choose the third person for the
panel.

72

The goals of the DRBs include; early resolution of
disputes on the contract administration, minimizing

surprise disputes at project completion and by their mere
existence to encourage parties to resolve disputes or face

DRB process.'

The first goal, focuses resources on dispute
resolution early in the life of the contract to avoid
costlier, more litigious and typically less satisfying

results later on. The fact that the non-binding DRB
recommendation can be introduced in subsequent arbitration

is a key motivator for both sides to research the dispute
thoroughly prior to the issue meeting.
The second goal on minimizing surprises is aided by

the present state specification that requires referral of
a dispute to the DRB or the Contractor can not pursue the

issue as an exception (Claim) to the proposed final

payment or take the matter to arbitration.
Finally the last goal, by their existence,

they

encourage both sides to work together to resolve disputes

without going through DRB process. This goes to the issues
of timeliness and cost of further delays.
Additionally, minor issues may not be brought before

the DRB because of the expense that the contractor or the

state may incur. Also issues without basis may not be
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brought before the DRB because the party may risk

influencing the DRB negatively on future issues within the
project completion (16:6).
DRBs began as a pilot project in Los Angeles in the
year 1990. The original pilot started with six DRBs for

the Los Angeles construction projects. The DRB is put into

place when the contract with the state cost involved is
ten million dollars or more and the engineers estimate
concludes that they will be working for 200 or more days

on the project. The success of the pilot project lead the

way to the "optional" specification on DRBs being included
in the 1994 version of the Caltran's "Standard Special

Provisions". Consultant analysis that Caltrans procured in
1996 lead to the DRBs becoming mandatory on large state

projects.
By 1998, the DRBs became a mandatory specification on
qualified construction projects.

While the DRBs continued

to evolve throughout the 1990s the organization learned

that given the option, the construction contractor would
only establish a DRB nine percent of the time that one was

optional. For those cases where a DRB was established,

they were often started "considerably into the project

after disputes had arisen"

(16:3).
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An analysis of DRB statistics reveal that since the

ideas inception DRBs have been established on 190 projects
since 1990

(16:5). In the year 2002, there were 80 DRBs

statewide. These 80 DRBs accounted for over four billion
dollars of construction projects across the state. Further

analysis showed that less than half

(43%)

of projects with

an established DRB have had an issue presented to the
board.

The table below shows the results of an analysis of
175 DRB cases where the state received substantially

complete information (See Figure 1).

Figure 1. Dispute Review Board Recommendations
Source: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 6.

As illustrated the DRBs ruled in the states favor 42%

of the time, the contractor's 52% and for both parties 6%
of the time.

The primary concerns expressed by DRBs were the
timeliness and communication issues. One example of DRB

concern is the late establishment of a DRB when the
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construction project are well under way or the parties are

already involved in a dispute. The failure to hold DRB

status meetings regularly and issue meetings not being
heard in a timely manner was cause for complaint. Issue
meetings held near or after contract acceptance and new

issues being brought out after the acceptance of the
contract were additionally cited complaints. Communication

issues revolved around delayed notifications of intent to
reject the DRB recommendations and information on the DRBs

formation, status, disputes and completion not being
appropriately forwarded to all involved parties.

Timeliness is a major issue for DRBs due to the

statutory timelines imposed by the State Contract Act
Section 10240.2. From the date of contract acceptance, day
1 through day 240 is detailed in the timeline shown below

(See Figure 2).
Claim Position
Letter Day 135

PFE Issued
Day 45
1r
Contract
Acceptance
Day Zero

i

PFE
Returned
Day 75

L

'

JL

1

▼

r

BOR Meeting
Day 180

Figure 2, Claims Resolution Timeline Day 1 Through Day 240
Source: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 4.
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The next table illustrates DRB acceptance rates.

These statistics were based on the 175 cases reviewed

where the state received substantially complete
information (See Table 1).

Table 1. Dispute Review Board Recommendation Acceptance
Rates by Party

□ State

S Contractor

Source: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 8.

Acceptance rates were higher by the state at 85% on
the overall statistics and 73% on unfavorable rulings. The
contractors' rates were lower at 74% for overall and 42%
for unfavorable rulings.

Most DRB cases

structures

(109 of the 175 reviewed)

are

(bridge and building construction) related, in

that they involve the Structures Construction Office.
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Analysis of these oases reveals that the most frequent

issues are pilings, temporary facilities, welding,
tiebacks and soil nails. The following chart illustrates

the frequency percentages from the case analysis

(See

Table 2).

Table 2. Frequency of Dispute Review Board Issues

DRB Issues

Frequency

Pilings

27%

Temporary
Facilities
Welding

9%

Tiebacks/ Soil
Nails
Other Items

7%

9%

48%

Source: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 9.

The analysis of the cases showed that 62% of all DRBs
involved structures. These structures cases revealed a
slightly larger percentage

(46%) of favorable decisions

for the state than the statewide percentage
Figure 3).
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(42%)

(See

Figure 3. Dispute Review Board. Recommendations on
Structure Cases

6%

48%

46%

□ Contractor's Favor
estate's Favor
□ Both

Source-: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 3.

Recent DRB Modifications include revisions in the
Standard Special Provisions which adds a retention clause,

a time frame for issue meetings, clarifications on the

completion of the DRB process, and details for DRB member

removal. Additionally,

the changes improve the pay scale

for DRB members. Traditionally the DRB is a three-man
panel that is assigned to a construction project.

Currently the DRB members are paid $150.00 per hour plus
expenses as of 2003 wages. Also Construction Procedures

Bulletin (CPB)

02-1 Dispute Review Board Process and

Responsibilities establishes written policy and procedures
for DRB administration including handling of

recommendations and provides DRB status forms for the
Department to evaluate the DRB program effectiveness.

To improve acceptance rates by parties of DRBs

rulings, planning and training sessions for staff and
interested parties are available. These include a DRB
effective presentation course and a dispute training
course.

Board of Review

The Board of Review is a state panel, which provides
one of the last forms of remedy for construction disputes

The Board of Review is engaged after the DRB process has
concluded. The Board of Review is made up of state

managing employees.

The table below reveals details of the financial

awards made to the contractors compared to the amounts

claimed by the contractors. As you can see very little is
paid at this point. This is because, before a claim gets
to the Board of Review the issue has usually been

discussed with management during the project and has the
management's support in denying payment on the issue.

After the Board of Review decision the contractor can
require the issue go to formal litigation (arbitration).

Below is a table showing the amount claimed versus the

amount awarded by the Board of Reviews

\
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(See Table 3).

Table 3.

Board of Review Awards

13Dispute Amount
0BOR Award Amount

Source-: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 3.

Arbitration

Arbitration is the legal process that occurs when the

State and the contractor can not come to agreement and
formal litigation is required. This process is very

expensive to both the state and the contractor and
typically the cost of the claim increases significantly.

The state usually limits the cases going to arbitration to
only those with the best chance of winning decisions for
the state. However, the pay out on the cases decided

against the state is usually much higher than the original

claim presented at the project level. Below is the number
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of oases since 1979 that Caltrans took to arbitration. You
can see an increase leading up to 1999

(See Table 4). This

is due to a large number of small contracts during the
bridge seismic retrofit programs.

Table 4. Caltrans Construction Arbitration Filing HistoryThrough December

Years

Source: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 5.

Since 1979, there have been 548 Arbitration
Complaints filed and 482 resolved. This leaves 66

unresolved cases at this time. Since 1994, there have been
304 filings for a value of $458,552,383. Of this amount,
$99,464,913 has been paid out as awards. And since 1994,
88 cases have had arbitration awards. These 88 cases had

claim amounts of $151,162,849, with arbitration required
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payments of $45,082,259. Also,

since 1994, 118 cases have

been settled with a total claim amount of $105,694,544 and
a total settlement amount of $39,197,604. The graphical
representation of awards to settlement from 1996 to 2002

is shown below (See Table 5).

Table 5.

Arbitration Results 1996-2002

Source-: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 5.

Below you can see the percent paid compared to the

claim amount with respect to arbitration awards and
settlements. The average percent paid compared to the
complaint amount is 42% for those claims settled by
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arbitration award. The percent paid compared to the

complaint amount averages higher for arbitration awarded
compensation (See Table 6).

Table 6. Arbitration Results 1996-2002

a Awards H Settlements

Source-: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 10.

The following graph shows the number of arbitration

cases completed from 1996 to 2002. Additionally, each year
the number of awarded cases versus settled cases is shown
(See Table 7).
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Table 7. Arbitration Results 1996-2002

□Awards □Settlements

Source-: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 11.

Following you can see the number of claims, which

went to arbitration with respect to the twelve districts
for the year 2002

(See Table 8).
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Table 8. Current Arbitration Status by District Number of
Complaints Filed in 2002

H Number of Complaints

Source-: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 13.

The total on going cases in arbitration by district
(in dollars)

is depicted next
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(See Table 9).

Table 9. Dollars Claimed by District for 2001

Source-: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 14.

The cumulative unresolved cases from 1979 to 2002 can
also be seen (See Table 10).
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Table 10. Current Unresolved Cases

[EINumber of Cases |

Source-: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 14.

And the cumulative number of active arbitration cases
at each year's end is shown below (See Table 11).

Table 11. Cumulative Active Arbitration Cases

Source-: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 16.
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The increase in claims submitted by contractors over

the years represents changing attitudes of contractors and
the increasing complexity of construction contracts. The

bidding process is very competitive and the margin of
profit is minimal. Therefore, with the increased

complexity of new designs and contract specifications any

opportunity to claim additional compensation is a regular
occurrence. Contractors have become much more savvy to
delay claims, overhead claims, lost opportunity claims,
differing site condition claims, and inefficiency due to

change in character claims. These claims are legitimate,

however, often difficult to quantify.
When claims submitted by the contractor cannot be
agreed upon between the state and the contractor,
arbitration is the last resort. Business decisions are
made at this point by both the contractor and the.state

based on the strength of each side of the issue. The level
of documentation and the clarity of the contract regarding

the issue usually determine whether a case will be settled
or taken to the arbitrator. After the decision as to

whether the claim has merit or not is made, then the
determination of the compensation is made. The amount of

compensation is usually based on a cost analysis, which

includes time spent for labor and equipment, plus
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materials. Documentation of the day to day work by the
state and the contractor will agree often. This is true
for easy to quantify extra work claims, however claims

involving lost efficiency, delay, overhead cost, etc., are
much more difficult to quantify. Arbitrators, once the

claim has been determined to have merit, have the

difficult challenge of quantifying the value of the
compensation. Many times when the contract or
documentation is weak, it is usually in the best interest

of the state to settle with the contractor. Usually
settlements, compared to the original claim amount, have a
lower percentage paid, than arbitrator assessed cost.

The twelve districts in the state have differing
approaches to handling claims. Most have an aggressive

attitude to handling claims at the project level. Much
discretionary judgement is given to the project level

engineers. Other districts are more conservative in making
additional compensation when faced with contractor claims.
For the most part the engineers at the project level hold

a firm line with respect to making additional compensation
for contractor claims. Business decisions are not

permitted at the project level. Strict interpretation of

the contract specifications is the rule of thumb. Decision
regarding weakness or ambiguities in the contract are
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easier to make at the management level. Still business

decisions to make compensation based on the potential for
greater cost in arbitration is not made until the claim
goes past the Board of Review level.

The number of claims that go to arbitration and are
not awarded compensation leaves the question of how many

of these claims are falsely submitted. Many of these
claims can be honest contract disputes, however many could

be considered fraudulent claims or falsely inflated

claims. Even if a claim is determined to have merit, often
the claim amount is inflated and an inflated cost analysis

submitted by the contractor is considered a false claim.
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CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

The California Department of Transportation mission

statement, in part, states it is responsible for insuring
the mobility of the public across California. One of the

values included in the mission statement is stewardship.
Being good stewards of the states'

available resources

requires getting the most with the available resources.
This means constantly looking to improve cost savings

tactics.

The funding provided through the State Transportation
Improvement Program provides the majority of the money for

highway construction projects. These projects are
contracted out, typically to the lowest bidder. However,
these contracts are often extremely complex, with hundreds

of pages for plans, standard specifications and special

provisions on each contract. This leads to opportunity for
a large numbers of contract disputes. With the contracts

being awarded to the lowest bidder, the margin for profit
by these contractors is minimal. Contractors have become

skilled in the art of seeking additional compensation
after the contract is awarded. Contract issues regarding

changes to the original planned work,

92

lost opportunity and

overhead cost associated with delays in the work, and
inefficiencies and extra work due to changes is
characteristic of the work and often causes contract

disputes. Notices of potential claims are submitted to the
state for each of these contract disputes. Analysis of the

associated cost itself has become big business. Many

consultant firms focus on providing assistance to the
contractor in evaluating the cost associated with time
related overhead claims, construction progress schedule

delay claims and differing site condition claims. Project
engineers, contractors and experts struggle to handle and

settle these claims for additional compensation at the
project level.
Elaborate systems are in place to handle changes and

requests for additional compensation that arise during the
construction project. Many checks and balances are built

into the system. Often larger projects will have
individual Dispute Review Boards

(DRB) built into the

contract. However, the DRB usually only determines whether
a claim has merit or not, and does not consider the amount

of the cost associated with the claim. The potential
exists for false cost submittals when the DRB has
determined merit is found. DRB rule in the states'

42% of the time, and in the contractors'
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favor

favor 52% of the

time. The state and the contractor can reject the DRB's

decision, however the ruling is included in the reports
for further consideration by Board of Reviews and

Arbitration. Acceptance of the DRBs' decision is 85% by
the state overall and 73% for unfavorable decisions.

Contractors' acceptance of DRBs' decision is 74% overall
and 42% for unfavorable decisions to the contractor. A
project with or without a DRB will probably still have

unresolved claims at the end of the project. These claims
are then sent to the Caltrans' Boards of Review. However,

few claims are settled at this point and most go to the

legal department and arbitration. This is true because the
Caltrans' Boards of Review are made up of Caltrans'
Managers and these individuals are usually consulted

during the project level discussion and consideration of
the claims. Usually the costs associated with these claims

escalate from the project level to arbitration. The
percent paid, at arbitration, of claims submitted varies
from year to year. The amount paid also varies and is in
part a function of the settlements made prior to

arbitration decisions. The further the claim gets from the

project level, the wider the dispute becomes. This leads
to another potential for increased submissions of false

claims.
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The False Claims Act (FCA) originally conceived by

England in the 13th century, and first initiated in the
United States by President Lincoln during the Civil War,
allows private individuals to sue on behalf of the

government for the submission and payment of false claims
for compensation from the government. These "qui tam"

provisions of the FCA allow "whistle blowers" to be paid a
percentage of the fines imposed on the guilty party.

The current-day version of the FCA law, proposed by

President Reagan, empowers ordinary citizens to act as
private attorneys generally by filing qui tam
whistleblower suits against those who defraud the

government. Prompted by widely publicized cases of fraud

against the military in their procurement of supplies, the

new amended law allow citizens to receive 30% of the
action or 15% if the government agency participates. The

guilty party in a qui tam case, may pay fines between five
and ten thousand dollars for each act and as much as three

times the damages to the government. In the federal arena
the Attorney General is required to investigate violations
of the law. Since the passage of the amended FCA in 1986,

more than 3,000 qui tam cases have been filed.
In order to prove guilt under the FCA the party must

have "knowingly" contributed, that is have actual
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knowledge of the information and deliberately ignores the

truth. A claim under the FCA can be any demand for money

or property. The person alleging the false claim must
bring suit in both their names and the governments' name.

The government has 60 days to decide if it will join
in the action under the FCA. The individual bringing the
action,

if successful, is entitled to reimbursement of all

legal fees and court costs in addition to the judgement.
Government officials are not allowed to bring an action to

court.

The legislation seeks to protect the person bringing
the action, hence the "whistle blower" law. This

protection can extend to their employment. Any person who

is fired, suspended or harassed in any way due to a FCA
can seek relief under the legislation. This can include

being reinstated at work or whatever it takes to make the
employee feel whole again.
This paper reviews the legislation and court rulings
to determine their relevance for Caltrans. Caltrans must

defend the public dollars during the construction process.

Included is the California False Claims legislation since
Caltrans is a branch of California government.

The case law for the FCA is extensive. The courts
have addressed the constitutionality of the FCA, and
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whether are not a qui tam plaintiff has standing under

Article III of the Constitution (consistent with the
principles of the separation of the powers provisions).

The possible violation of the due process clause has been

addressed, along with defining whether a state could be
considered a "person" in a FCA action. Additionally, the

"public disclosure bar" included in the FCA legislation
has been addressed in the case law, along with the
"original source" and the "government intervention"

requirements of the FCA law.
Based on the Constitutional separation of powers
"Congress is powerless to distribute powers that it does
not have". This holding was from a Texas District Court,
in U.S. ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co. 9 F.3d 743

(9th Cir.

1993). The court also claimed Congress is not given the
power to prosecute fraud cases. The court stated that

standing was an integral part of our separation of powers
and Congress should not be allowed to circumvent the
Article III standing requirements. However, this ruling
was contradictory to years of case law and another Texas

court in the same district and later the same year,
disagreed with the unconstitutionality of the qui tam

provision of the False Claims Act. In U. S. ex rel.
Thompson v.

Columbia / HCA Healthcare Corp, et al., Order,
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Civil Action No. C-95-110 (S.D.

Tex. Aug. 18, 1998), this

Texas District Court noted that where the government has
suffered an injury-in-fact, the relator merely steps in as

its representative or assignee to carry out the statute's
purpose of remedying fraud against the government.

Moreover, the FCA provides sufficient control of the qui
tam suit and the relator has a personal stake in the
outcome of his suit. This court also observed that none,

including the Supreme Court has ruled the relator lack

standing in FCA litigation.
With respect to due process, in U.S. ex rel. Fallon et al.

v. Accudyne Corp, and Alliant Techsystems, Inc., the

defendants cited a case, which held that private attorneys
appointed, must be personally disinterested in criminal
prosecution. Therefore, the defendants claimed that the

due process clause is violated by permitting private
citizens with an interest in the outcome of the proceeding
to prosecute claims on behalf of the United States. The
court rejected the argument stating the case cited was a

criminal case and not a civil case and appointing a
relator

(or prosecutor) with an interest in the litigation

does not rise to a due process violation.

The Supreme Court decided in split decision that: "a
state or state agency is not a "person" subject to qui tam
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liability under § 3729 of the False Claims Act." (39:4)

The Court, looking at a longstanding resumption that the
term person does not include the sovereign, the Court

found no affirmative showing of congressional intent to

the contrary in the FCA. According to the Court, the FCA

as originally enacted in 1863 "bore no indication that
States were subject to its penalties" and none of the

subsequent amendments to the statute,

including the 1986

amendments, suggested a broadening of the term person

(39:5). The Court applied the ordinary rule of statutory
construction known as the clear statement rule, which

holds that "if Congress intends to alter the usual
constitutional balance between States and the Federal
Government, it must make its intention to do so
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." While

the Supreme Court concluded that an individual in a qui

tam action cannot sue a state, the Court did not decide
whether or not a suit could be brought by the United

States against a state. Justice Ginsburg stated,
"the clear statement rule applied to private
suits against a State has not been applied when
the United States is the plaintiff." therefore
"I read the Court's decision to leave open the
question whether the word 'person' encompasses
States when the United States itself sues under
the False Claims Act." (39:5)
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Also unresolved, by the Supreme Court is whether or not

municipalities, municipal agencies, counties and other

local government entities can be considered "persons" and

liable under the False Claims Act. Additionally, no
resolution was made whether a State or local "proprietary"
or "independent" entity can be sued and whether or not
State or other government employees can be sued as

"persons" under the False Claims Act.

The original source and public disclosure bar
provisions in the FCA have been addressed in U.S.

ex rel.

Grayson et al. v. Advanced Management Technology et al.
Section 3730 of the False Claims Act requires the relator
to be the original source of false claim information in a

qui tam suit, and the information can not be disclosed
publicly previous to the suit. In this case the false
claim information was derived from an administrative

complaint previously filed with the FAA by an unsuccessful
bidder of the government contract. The court also held the
relator "Grayson and Hoffman", who were acting as

attorneys for the Camber Corporation were not the original
source and the information provided by others was

insufficient as "direct" and "independent" knowledge as
required by the statute.

(41:1) Also with respect to the

public disclosure and direct knowledge provisions,
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in U.S.

ex rel. Hansen v. Cargill, Inc. et al., a California
district court ruled the relator did not have "direct
knowledge" and did not meet the original source

requirements of the False Claims Act, because the
information presented had been publicly disclosed by the
news media. The court made this ruling while acknowledging

the relator had been the source of the disclosure to the

media.

(41:2)

In U. S.

ex rel.

Coleman v. State of Indiana

et al., an Indiana district court decided that the public

disclosure bar of the False Claims Act included state
administrative proceedings and hearings. The court
dismissed the case stating his was not the original
source, since the Indiana General Assembly, Administrative

Rules Oversight Committee met and discussed a similar
compliant previous to Coleman suit. And in U.S.

ex rel.

Downy v. Corning, Inc. et al., a New Mexico district court

ruled in favor of the relator and a general public
discussion did not meet the public disclosure bar. The

court concluded that the intent was to prohibit qui tam

actions only when either the allegations of fraud or the
critical elements of the fraudulent transaction themselves
are public.

Government intervention provisions of the FCA are

studied in U.S. ex rel. Newsham and Bloem v. Lockheed
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Missiles and Space Company, Inc. The 11th Circuit Court

stated "once a qui tam suit is filed, the Government has

sixty days to choose one of only two options: to intervene
and proceed with the action, or to decline intervention.
In this case the court found "The government has from the

beginning flagrantly and repeatedly violated the
provisions of the statute." The 11th Circuit also "held

that the FCA does not contain a general prohibition
against government employees filing qui tam suits..."
(21:13). The court ruled that the Government's settlement

with NEC was an "intervention" in the lawsuit within the

meaning of the FCA. Further,

the settlement effectively

terminated the lawsuit, except for the determination of
Williams' statutory compensation of between 15 and 25
percent

(as well as attorneys' fees and expenses). The

court ruled that Williams was entitled to 15 percent of

the $34 million settlement.

Relevant FCA cases studied in the construction

industry include the City of Pomona v. Superior Court,
Cal. App. 4th 793

(2001), Stacy & Witbeck, Inc.

City

Cal. App. 4th 1, 54 Cal.

and County of San Francisco,
Rptr. 2d 530

v.
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(1996), United States versus Azzarelli

Construction Company in 1981,

United States ex rel. Ashol

Bhatnagar v. Kiewit Pacific Co., State of California,
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Department of Transportation,

U.S. ex rel. Shaw v. AAA

Engineering & Drafting, Inc.

et al., and cases with the

Los Angeles Metropolitan Authority versus its' contractors

Tutor-Saliba Corporation and Shea-Kiewit-Kenny.
In the City of Pomona case, we learned a supplier was
held accountable for out of specification materials used

on a city project. Although the supplier had no

contractual connection with the government, the California
FCA was used to litigate. The city contractor purchased

and installed pipe from a catalog,

stating the pipe met

the specified corrosion requirements. However, the

supplier had changed the pipe construction without
changing the catalog. The supplier was found to be liable
under the FCA and required to pay damages even though the
supplier had no contract with the city and had made no

direct claim for payment with the city.

In Stacy & Witbeck, Inc. v. City and County of San
Francisco, the contractor stated the documentation

provided to the city during the contractual claims process

was inadmissible in the FCA case filed by the government.

Stacy and Witbeck asserted the claims were submitted in
anticipation of litigation and therefore privileged. The
court disagreed, stating the submission was a contractual

requirement and the contractor had no immunity for False
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Claim liability, for statements and claims made in the
course of the contractual claims submission process.
In the case of the United States versus Azzarelli

Construction Company in 1981 the defendants allegedly

rigged a bid on a state highway project. However,

the

court ruled even if the alleged rigging of the bid was

true, the federal government had not paid additional money
as a result. The money paid by the federal government to
states for highway construction was fixed and was

unchanged by the bidding. Therefore, the federal
government had not been damaged and the case was
dismissed.
In the case United States ex rel. Ashol Bhatnagar v.

Kiewit Pacific Co., State of California, Department of
Transportation, a U.S. District Court for Northern

California dismissed the case. Bhatnagar brought the FCA

action against Kiewit Pacific stating Kiewit Pacific

claimed additional compensation to provide storm water
control. The contract included storm water protection as
part of the original bid price, however the requirements

for storm water protection were changed by the California

Regional Water Quality Board after the bid was awarded.
The judge dismissed the action stating this was a contract
dispute issue.
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Bhatnagar also brought action against the State of

California, Department of Transportation (Caltrans),

for

retaliation against Bhatnagar and for submitting request

for federal reimbursement under an approved traffic
control change order. The judge also dismissed the action

against Caltrans, stating the state was not liable under

the FCA since the state was not considered a "person".
In U.S.

ex rel. Shaw v. AAA Engineering & Drafting,

Inc. et al., the contractor was paid full payment for an

item of work which included disposal of materials per the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) . The contractor

stated the government knew the disposal was not being
performed per the EPA requirements and the fixed bid price
for the work and there was no misrepresentation. The court

disagreed and found AAA liable under the FCA. The court
asserted that by the monthly billing, AAA has expressed or

implied compliance with the contract and the EPA

requirement.
In the cases with the Los Angeles Metropolitan

Transit Authority (MTA) versus its' contractors Tutor-

Saliba Corporation and Shea-Kiewit-Kenny (SKK), the court

found the contractors liable under the FCA despite

ambiguities and omissions in the contract plans and
specifications. SKK had left out of the original bid price
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what he thought was work that had been omitted or unclear
on the contract plans. After the contract was awarded many

subsequent requests for change orders and additional
compensation were made that increased the project costs by
more than $179 million (25:2). Additionally, MTA accused

SKK of using substandard materials. In the Tutor-Saliba

Corporation case the judge stated the contractor was
liable for unfair business practices, including false
claims and improper listing of contractors

(31:1). The

judge ruled in favor of the MTA for approximately 31.4

million dollars

(34:3).

Conclusion
The implications for the California Department of
Transportation (Caltrans) can be studied in the individual
cases. The federal and state FCAs are proving to be

effective tools against fraud in government contracts.
Awards in the millions and billions of dollars have been

issued as a result of FCA litigation. The acts have
sustained Supreme Court and lower courts scrutiny. Aspects
of the FCA laws have been well defined by recent court

ruling. FCA litigation can be brought by the government

agencies involved or by private individual. The qui tam

provisions of the act allow whistleblowers whom are the
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original source of the false claim to receive a
substantial percentage of the fines and penalties in a

successful litigation. In the case of United States ex

rel. Ashol Bhatnagar v. Kiewit Pacific Co., State of

California, Department of Transportation, the contract

between Kiewit and Caltrans clearly required Kiewit to

adhere to the California law regarding storm water
protection. However, the increased enforcement of the law

by Caltrans, a result of pressure from the California

Regional Water Quality Board, cost the contractor more
than his bid reflected. Even though the contract required

storm water protection included in the bid, the contractor
based his bid on the historic enforcement of the

requirement. Mr. Bhatnagar contended in his FCA action
that claiming the cost for meeting the requirements of the

California Regional Water Quality Board and Caltrans
amounted to a false claim, because the language of the
contract specified meeting the storm water protection

requirements as part of the contract. Despite.the fact the
contract required this work and the contractor filed a
claim for addition compensation, the court decided this
was a contract dispute issue and not a false claim. It is
not uncommon for additional compensation to be claimed,

even when the contract is clear on the required work, when
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historically the enforcement of the required work has been

less. A contract for a construction project will typically
have four main documents as part of the contract. These

include the plans,

standard specifications, standard

plans, and special provisions for the project. In
addition, the standard specifications will include and

refer to Federal and State laws, which thereby become part
of the contract as well. These additional documents and

laws are numerous and the rules and enforcement of the
laws change due to legal rulings, policy changes, etc. As
we learn from the Bhatnagar versus Kiewit case provisions

clearly stated in the contract can be legitimately claimed

and considered a contract dispute and not a false claim.

Basing the bid price on the historical enforcement of the
contract language, then claiming additional cost when

enforcement and policies change is economically sound for
the state, since this keeps the bidding prices low until a
particular issue comes to light and increased work is

demanded.

With respect to the Bhatnagar versus Kiewit case we
also learned the state and its' agencies are not liable
for retaliation under the FCA. Additionally, the state and

its' agencies are not liable in federal litigation under
the FCA. The fact that the storm water protection claim
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and payment was submitted for federal reimbursement under

the traffic control change order of the contract did not
negate the states' immunity to the FCA.
In a similar case can be made where the contract

required adherence to the EPA law, the court found the

contractor liable under the FCA for not meeting the

requirement. According to U.S. ex rel. Shaw v. AAA
Engineering & Drafting, inc.

et al., the contractor was

paid full payment for the item of work contracted which
included disposal of materials. The contractor stated the

government knew he was not meeting the EPA law, however
paid him for the work. The implication for Caltrans is
that private individuals can sue government contractors

for noncompliance of numerous state and federal
regulations, when full payment is made for the item work
associated with the government regulations.

A publicly disclosed noncompliance or false claim
cannot be litigated under the FCA. In U.S. ex rel. Hansen

v. Cargill, Inc. et al., the FCA relator Hansen filed

litigation after the media had released the information
supporting the action. The court ruled the defendant was
not liable under the FCA due to the public disclosure bar

provision of the act, despite the fact Hansen was the
source to the media release. And in U.S. ex rel. Coleman
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v. State of Indiana et al., we learn the public disclosure
bar includes administrative hearing. This is not the case

however, where fraud or fraudulent transactions themselves
are not discussed as in U.S. ex rel. Downy v. Corning,
Inc. et al.

The implications for Caltrans of the FCA ruling in
U.S. ex rel. Newsham and Bloem v. Lockheed Missiles and

Space Company, Inc. are both government employees can
bring FCA action and the government agency cannot settle

the litigation out of court independent of the relator.
The settlement by the government in this case effectively
terminated the lawsuit, except for the determination of

Williams' statutory compensation of between 15 and 25

percent

(as well as attorneys' fees and expenses). The

court ruled that Williams was entitled to 15 percent of

the $34 million settlement.
With respect to the City of Pomona v. Superior Court
case we learn a significant implication regarding

subcontractor, and suppliers not directly contracted with
Caltrans. In this case, the supplier for the contractor

provided materials which did not meet the specifications

of the contract, yet implied to the contractor, in
catalogs, the materials did meet the specifications. Even

though there was no contract with the supplier, the City
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of Pomona was able to use the California FCA to sue the

supplier. Caltrans' projects will have one contract with
the prime contractor. The prime contractor will have

numerous subcontractors and suppliers. These
subcontractors and suppliers have no contract with the
state, however will routinely submit claims for additional

compensation from the state through the prime contractor.

The FCA is proven in the City of Pomona case to be a

viable course to address fraud by companies with no
contractual obligation to the government agency.
In Stacy & Witbeck, Inc. v.

City and County of San

Francisco, the implication for Caltrans is that the
contractual requirement for "notice of potential claims"
documentation can be used in later FCA action. The

Standard Specifications requires a notice of potential
claim be submitted within 15 days of the contractor

learning of an issue that might yield a claim. This notice
of potential claim starts a process of project level

discussion regarding the issue and sometimes leads to

contract change order

(payment), dispute review board

hearings, or negotiations of the issue. Documentation of
costs are required for the notice of potential claim. In

the Stacy and Witbeck case the defendant argued the

documentation submitted was privileged since further
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arbitration was anticipated. The court decided however,

these documents were admissible in FCA actions. Even

though a fraudulent notice of potential claim probably can
not be considered a FCA violation, the documentation

submitted in the notice of potential claim process can be
used if a formal claim is later submitted.

And finally with respect to Caltrans we learn in the
MTA case against Tutor-Saliba Corporation and Shea-Kiewit-

Kenny failure on the part of the contractor to submit pre

bid documents during claims discussions are FCA
violations. Additionally, many requirements regarding

bidding practices, submitting of extra work bills and

contractual requirements for listing subcontractor can be
used in FCA litigation. Caltrans routinely experiences

claims for additional compensation for ambiguities and
omissions in the plans and specifications left out of the

original bid. Called "low ball" bidding where omissions
from the bid are made then later requested in additional

compensation through contract change orders or claims,
these practices are unfair. Pre-bid calculations are

required during claims negotiations and failure to submit
this documentation is a violation of the FCA.

The Caltrans processes and procedures for handling
contract change orders, notice of potential claims,
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claims, settlements and arbitrations are comprehensive. It
is difficult to say of the many claims submitted, how many

are fraudulent. Most claims are legitimate contract

disputes. The contract specifications require notice of
potential claims so discussion can be started at the
project level. Many of these notices of potential claims

result in contract change orders where additional
compensation is made. Approvals of these change orders

require several levels of concurrence.
Any additional compensation that has any doubt in
appropriateness would not be approved and required to go
to a Dispute Review Board (DRB). At the Dispute Review

Board level these claims for the majority are considered
to have merit and usually additional compensation is made.

For the most part, a ruling by the DRB is accepted by both
parties, however not always.
The Caltrans Board of Review decides again if the

claim is unsettled and before it goes to Caltrans legal

department for settlement or arbitration. Contractor

claims for additional compensation which go to arbitration
are the cases Caltrans feels most likely the state will

win. Otherwise the claim is typically settled. In order
for a fraudulent claim to be paid, theoretically, it would

have to pass the arbitration process. This is not likely,
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because a fraudulent claim is by definition not simply a
contract dispute and is easily seen by the arbitrator as

false in nature.

Recommendations

This paper recommends that the federal and state FCAs
might not be a good tool against false or fraudulent

Caltrans construction claims. Many of the state
contractors are repeat bidders. Most claims submitted by

these contractors are honest contract disputes. It is
possible that contractors, subcontractors and suppliers

submit claims, which might be considered false. However,
the Caltrans system for handling claims,

from the initial

notice of potential claim, to the DRB, Board of Review and
arbitration, effectively weeds out the inappropriate

claims. The FCA could be used as a punitive tool for

contractors submitting false claims, however the long term
result might be more costly than a benefit. The FCA action
can be brought by private citizens as well as government

agencies. If the legitimate state contractors were forced
to face numerous FCA litigation,

the result would be

reflected in higher project bid prices and possibly lower

the number of bidders. Actions brought by private citizens
would undermine the- governmental agencies authority and

big picture concerns for the best public interest. Actions
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brought by the government agency might encourage more
private actions brought and thus opening a Pandora's box.

The upside of punishing the dishonest contractors would be

outweighed by the additional cost incurred by the honest
state contractors subjected to FCA litigation. The

exception to the rule is the possible FCA litigation of
subcontractor and suppliers when there is no direct
contract with the subcontractor or supplier, as in the

City of Pomona versus Superior Court case. However,

even

in the case of subcontractors and suppliers, the potential

down side of increased FCA cases to all contractors

suggest other recourse should be sought.
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-CITE—

31 USC Sec. 3729
-EXPCITETITLE 31 - MONEY AND FINANCE

SUBTITLE III - FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

CHAPTER 37 - CLAIMS
SUBCHAPTER III - CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

-HEAD-

Sec. 3729. False claims
-STATUTEа) Liability for Certain Acts. - Any person who 1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or
employee of the United States Government or a member of the Armed
Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment
or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a
false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or
approved by the Government;
(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or
fraudulent claim allowed or paid;
(4) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or
to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the
Government or willfully to conceal the property, delivers, or causes
to be delivered, less property than the amount for which
the person receives a certificate or receipt;
5) authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of
property used, or to be used, by the government and, intending to
defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without
completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true;
б) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt,
public property from an officer or employee of the Government, or a
member of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge the
property; or
7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a
false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an
obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government, is liable to the United States Government for a civil
penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3
times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of
the act of that person, except that if the court finds that (A)
the person committing the violation of this
subsection furnished officials of the United States responsible for
investigating false claims violations with all information known to
such person about the violation within 30 days after the date on
which the defendant first obtained the information;
(B) such person fully cooperated with any Government investigation of
such violation; and
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(C) at the time such person furnished the United States with the
information about the violation, no criminal prosecution, civil
action, or administrative action had commenced under this title with
respect to such violation, and the person did not have actual
knowledge of the existence of an investigation into such violation;
the court may assess not less than 2 times the amount of damages
which the Government sustains because of the act of the person. A
person violating this subsection shall also be liable to the United
States Government for the costs of a civil action brought to recover
any such penalty or damages.
(b) Knowing and Knowingly Defined. - For purposes of this
section, the terms ’’knowing'1 and 1’knowingly'' mean that a
person, with respect to information (1) has actual knowledge of the information;
(2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information; or
(3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
information, and no proof of specific intent to defraud is
required.

Claim Defined. - For purposes of this section, ’'claim' ' includes
any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for
money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or
other recipient if the United States Government provides any
portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded,
or if the Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or
other recipient for any portion of the money or
property which
is requested or demanded.
(d) Exemption From Disclosure. - Any information furnished pursuant
to subparagraphs (A) through (C) of subsection (a) shall be
exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5.
(e) Exclusion. - This section does not apply to claims, records, or
statements made under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
(c)

-SOURCE-

(Pub. L. 97-258, Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 978; Pub. L. 99-562,
Sec.

2, Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3153; Pub. L. 103-272, Sec.
4(f)(1)(O),
July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1362.)
-MISC1Historical and Revision Notes

Revised Section
Large)
3729

Source (U.S. Code)

Source (Statutes at

31:231.

R.S. Sec. 3490.

In the section, before clause (1), the words ''a member of an
armed force of the United States'' are substituted for ''in the
military or naval forces of the United States, or in the militia
called into or actually employed in the service of the United
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States’' and ’'military or naval service'' for consistency with
title 10. The words ’’is liable'' are substituted for ''shall forfeit
and pay'' for consistency. The words ''civil action'' are
substituted for ''suit'' for consistency in the revised title and
with other titles of the United States Code. The words ''and such
forfeiture and damages shall be sued for in the same suit'' are
omitted as unnecessary because of rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (28 App. U.S.C.). In clauses (l)-(3), the words
''false or fraudulent'1 are substituted for ''false, fictitious, or
fraudulent'' and ''Fraudulent or fictitious'' to eliminate
unnecessary words and for consistency. In clause (1), the words
''presents, or causes to be presented'' are substituted for ''shall
make or cause to be made, or present or cause to be presented'' for
clarity and consistency and to eliminate unnecessary words. The
words ''officer or employee of the Government or a member of an armed
force'' are substituted for ''officer in the civil, military, or
naval service of the United States'' for consistency in the revised
title and with other titles of the Code. The words ''upon or against
the Government of the United States, or any department of the United
States, or any department or officer thereof'' are omitted as
surplus.
In clause
(2), the word ''knowingly'' is substituted for
''knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement
or entry'' to eliminate unnecessary words. The words ''record or
statement’’ are substituted for ''bill, receipt, voucher, roll,
account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or deposition'' for
consistency in the revised title and with other titles of the Code.
In clause (3), the words ''conspires to1' are substituted for
''enters into any agreement, combination, or conspiracy'' to
eliminate unnecessary words. The words "of the United States, or
any department or officer thereof'' are omitted as surplus. In
clause (4), the words
''charge'', ’’or other'', and ''to any other
person having authority to receive the same'' are omitted as surplus.
In clause
(5), the words ''document certifying receipt1' are
substituted for
11 certificate, voucher, receipt, or other paper
certifying the receipt'' to eliminate unnecessary words. The words
''arms, ammunition, provisions, clothing, or other'', ''to any other
person'', and ''the truth of'1 are omitted as surplus. In clause
(6), the words ''arms, equipments, ammunition, clothes, military
stores, or other'' are omitted as surplus. The words ''member of an
armed force'' are substituted for ''soldier, officer, sailor, or
other person called into or employed in the military or naval
service'' for consistency with title 10. The words ''such soldier,
sailor, officer, or other person'' are omitted as surplus.
-REFTEXT-

REFERENCES IN TEXT
The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec.

(e),

is

classified generally to Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.
-MISC2-

AMENDMENTS

1994 - Subsec.
''1954''.

(e). Pub. L. 103-272 substituted ''1986'' for
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1986 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 99-562, Sec. 2(1), designated
existing provisions as subsec. (a), inserted subsec. heading, and
substituted ''Any person who'' for ’'A person not a member of an
armed force of the United States is liable to the United States
Government for a civil penalty of $2,000, an amount equal to 2
times the amount of damages the Government sustains because of the
act of that person, and costs of the civil action, if the person''
in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 99-562, Sec. 2(2), substituted ''United
States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United
States'' for ''Government or a member of an armed force''.
Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 99-562, Sec. 2(3), inserted ''by the
Government'' after ''approved''.
Subsec. (a)(4). Pub. L. 99-562, Sec. 2(4), substituted
''control of property'' for ''control of public property'' and ''by
the Government'' for ''in an armed force''.
Subsec. (a) (5) . Pub . L. 99-562, Sec. 2(5) , substituted ' 'by the
mT-nont* t 1 for ' 'in an armed force' ' and ''true;; ' ' for ' ' true;
OJ_
Subsec. (a) (6) . Pub . L. 99-562, Sec. 2(6), substituted ' 1 an
officer or employee of the Government, or a member of the Armed
Forces,'' for ''a member of an armed force'' and ''property; or"
for ''property.''
Subsec. (a)(7). Pub. L. 99-562, Sec. 2(7), added par. (7).
Subsecs, (b) to (e). Pub. L. 99-562, Sec. 2(7), added subsecs.
(b) to (e) .
l

INCREASED PENALTIES FOR FALSE CLAIMS IN DEFENSE PROCUREMENT

Pub. L. 99-145, title IX, Sec. 931(b), Nov. 8, 1985, 99 Stat.
699, provided that: ''Notwithstanding section 3729 of title 31,
United States Code, the amount of the liability under that section
in the case of a person who makes a false claim related to a
contract with the Department of Defense shall be a civil penalty of
$2,000, an amount equal to three times the amount of the damages
the Government sustains because of the act of the person, and costs
of the civil action.''

(Section 931(c) of Pub. L. 99-145 provided that section 931(b)
is
applicable to claims made or presented on or after Nov. 8, 1985.)
-SECREF-

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in sections 3730, 3731, 3732, 3733
of this title; title 10 section 2324; title 15 section 657a; title 20
section 1078-9; title 41 section 256; title 42 section 1395i.

122

APPENDIX C

CALIFORNIA FALSE CLAIMS ACT

123

CALIFORNIA FALSE CLAIMS ACT
CALIFORNIA CODES
GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 12650-12655

12650.
(a) This article shall be known and may be cited as the
False Claims Act.
(b) For purposes of this article:
(1) "Claim" includes any request or demand for money, property, or
services made to any employee, officer, or agent of the state or of
any political subdivision, or to any contractor, grantee, or other
recipient, whether under contract or not, if any portion of the
money, property, or services requested or demanded issued from, or
was provided by, the state (hereinafter "state funds") or by any
political subdivision thereof (hereinafter "political subdivision
funds").
(2) "Knowing" and "knowingly" mean that a person, with respect to
information, does any of the following:
(A) Has actual knowledge of the information.
(B) Acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information.
(C) Acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
information. Proof of specific intent to defraud is not required.
(3) "Political subdivision" includes any city, city and county,
county, tax or assessment district, or other legally authorized local
governmental entity with jurisdictional boundaries.
(4) "Prosecuting authority" refers to the county counsel, city
attorney, or other local government official charged with
investigating, filing, and conducting civil legal proceedings on
behalf of, or in the name of, a particular political subdivision.
(5) "Person" includes any natural person, corporation, firm,
association, organization, partnership, limited liability company,
business, or trust.
12651.
(a) Any person who commits any of the following acts shall
be liable to the state or to the political subdivision for three
times the amount of damages which the state or the political
subdivision sustains because of the act of that person. A person who
commits any of the following acts shall also be liable to the state
or to the political subdivision for the costs of a civil
actionbrought to recover any of those penalties or damages, and may
be
liable to the state or political sudivision for a civil penalty of up
to ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for each false claim:
(1) Knowingly presents or causes to be presented to an officer or
employee of the state or of any political subdivision thereof, afalse
claim for payment or approval.
(2) Knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used a false
record or statement to get a false claim paid or approved by the
state or by any political subdivision.
(3) Conspires to defraud the state or any political subdivision by
getting a false claim allowed or paid by the state or by any
political subdivision.
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(4) Has possession, custody, or control of public property or money
used or to be used by the state or by any political subdivision and
knowingly delivers or causes to be delivered less property than the
amount for which the person receives a certificate or receipt.
(5) Is authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of
property used or to be used by the state or by any political
subdivision and knowingly makes or delivers a receipt that falsely
represents the property used or to be used.
(6) Knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt,
public property from any person who lawfully may not sell or pledge
the property.
(7) Knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used a false
record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to
pay or transmit money or property to the state or to any political
subdivision.
,
(8) Is a beneficiary of an inadvertent submission of a false claim to
the state or a political subdivision, subsequently discovers the
falsity of the claim, and fails to disclose the false claim to the
state or the political subdivision within a reasonable time after
discovery of the false claim.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the court may assess not less
than two times and not more than three times the amount of damages
which the state or the political subdivision sustains because of the
act of the person described in that subdivision, and no civil
penalty, if the court finds all of the following:
(1) The person committing the violation furnished officials of the
state or of the political subdivision responsible for investigating
false claims violations with all information known to that person
about the violation within 30 days after the date on which the
personfirst obtained the information.
(2) The person fully cooperated with any investigation by the state
or a political subdivision of the violation.
(3) At the time the person furnished the state or the political
subdivision with information about the violation, no criminal
prosecution, civil action, or administrative action had commenced
with respect to the violation, and the person did not have actual
knowledge of the existence of an investigation into the violation.
(c) Liability under this section shall be joint and several for any
act committed by two or more persons.
(d) This section does not apply to any controversy involving an
amount of less than five hundred dollars ($500) in value. For
purposes of this subdivision, "controversy" means any one or more
false claims submitted by the same person in violation of this
article.
(e) This section does not apply to claims, records, or statements
made pursuant to Division 3.6 (commencing with Section 810) of Title
1 or to workers' compensation claims filed pursuant to Division 4
(commencing with Section 3200) of the Labor Code.
(f) This section does not apply to claims, records, or statements
made under the Revenue and Taxation Code.

12652.
(a) (1) The Attorney General shall diligently investigate
violations under Section 12651 involving state funds. If the
Attorney General finds that a person has violated or is violating
Section 12651, the Attorney General may bring a civil action under
this section against that person.
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(2) If the Attorney General brings a civil action under this
subdivision on a claim involving political subdivision funds as well
as state funds, the Attorney General shall, on the same date that the
complaint is filed in this action, serve by mail with "return receipt
requested" a copy of the complaint on the appropriate prosecuting
authority.
(3) The prosecuting authority shall have the right to intervene in an
action brought by the Attorney General under this subdivision within
60 days after receipt of the complaint pursuant to paragraph(2). The
court may permit intervention thereafter upon a showingthat all of
the requirements of Section 387 of the Code of Civil
Procedure have been met.
(b) (1) The prosecuting authority of a political subdivision shall
diligently investigate violations under Section 12651 involving
political subdivision funds. If the prosecuting authority finds that
a person has violated or is violating Section 12651, the prosecuting
authority may bring a civil action under this section against that
person.
(2) If the prosecuting authority brings a civil action under this
section on a claim involving state funds as well as political
subdivision funds, the prosecuting authority shall, on the same date
that the complaint is filed in this action, serve a copy of
thecomplaint on the Attorney General.
(3) Within 60 days after receiving the complaint pursuant to
paragraph (2), the Attorney General shall do either of the following:
(A) Notify the court that it intends to proceed with the action, in
which case the Attorney General shall assume primary
responsibility for conducting the action and the prosecuting
authority shall have the right to continue as a party.
(B) Notify the court that it declines to proceed with the action, in
which case the prosecuting authority shall have the right to conduct
the action.
(c) (1) A person may bring a civil action for a violation of this
article for the person and either for the State of California in the
name of the state, if any state funds are involved, or for a
political subdivision in the name of the political subdivision, if
political subdivision funds are exclusively involved. The person
bringing the action shall be referred to as the qui tam plaintiff.
Once filed, the action may be dismissed only with the written consent
of the court, taking into account the best interests of the parties
involved and the public purposes behind this act.
(2) A complaint filed by a private person under this subdivision
shall be filed in superior court in camera and may remain under seal
for up to 60 days. No service shall be made on the defendant until
after the complaint is unsealed.
(3) On the same day as the complaint is filed pursuant to
paragraph (2), the qui tam plaintiff shall serve by mail with "return
receipt requested" the Attorney General with a copy of the complaint
and a written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and
information the person possesses.
(4) Within 60 days after receiving a complaint and written
disclosure of material evidence and information alleging violations
that involve state funds but not political subdivision funds, the
Attorney General may elect to intervene and proceed with the action.
(5) The Attorney General may, for good cause shown, move the court
for extensions of the time during which the complaint remains under
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seal pursuant to paragraph (2). The motion may be supported by
affidavits or other submissions in camera.
(6) Before the expiration of the 60-day period or any extensions
obtained under paragraph (5), the Attorney General shall do either of
the following:
(A) Notify the court that it intends to proceed with the action, in
which case the action shall be conducted by the Attorney General and
the seal shall be lifted.
(B) Notify the court that it declines to proceed with the action,
in which case the seal shall be lifted and the qui tam plaintiff
shall have the right to conduct the action.
(7) (A) Within 15 days after receiving a complaint alleging
violations that exclusively involve political subdivision funds, the
Attorney General shall forward copies of the complaint and written
disclosure of material evidence and information to the appropriate
prosecuting authority for disposition, and shall notify the qui tam
plaintiff of the transfer.
(B) Within 45 days after the Attorney General forwards the complaint
and written disclosure pursuant to subparagraph (A) , the prosecuting
authority may elect to intervene and proceed with the action.
(C) The prosecuting authority may, for good cause shown, move for
extensions of the time during which the complaint remains under seal.
The motion may be supported by affidavits or other submissions in
camera.
(B) Before the expiration of the 45-day period or any extensions
obtained under subparagraph (C), the prosecuting authority shall do
either of the following:
(i) Notify the court that it intends to proceed with the action,
in which case the action shall be conducted by the prosecuting
authority and the seal shall be lifted.
(ii) Notify the court that it declines to proceed with the action,
in which case the seal shall be lifted and the qui tam plaintiff
shall have the right to conduct the action.
(8) (A) Within 15 days after receiving a complaint alleging
violations that involve both state and political subdivision funds,
the Attorney General shall forward copies of the complaint and
written disclosure to the appropriate prosecuting authority, and
shall coordinate its review and investigation with those of the
prosecuting authority.
(B) Within 60 days after receiving a complaint and written disclosure
of material evidence and information alleging violations that involve
both state and political subdivision funds, the Attorney General or
the prosecuting authority, or both, may elect to intervene and
proceed with the action.
(C) The Attorney General or the prosecuting authority, or both, may,
for good cause shown, move the court for extensions of the time
during which the complaint remains under seal under paragraph (2).
The motion may be supported by affidavits or other submissions in
camera.
(D) Before the expiration of the 60-day period or any extensions
obtained under subparagraph (C), the Attorney General shall do one of
the following:
(i) Notify the court that it intends to proceed with the action, in
which case the action shall be conducted by the Attorney General and
the seal shall be lifted.
(ii) Notify the court that it declines to proceed with the action but
that the prosecuting authority of the political subdivision involved
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intends to proceed with the action, in which case the seal shall be
lifted and the action shall be conducted by the prosecuting
authority.
(iii) Notify the court that both it and the prosecuting authority
decline to proceed with the action, in which case the seal shall be
lifted and the qui tam plaintiff shall have the right to conduct the
action.
(E) If the Attorney General proceeds with the action pursuant to
clause (i) of subparagraph (D), the prosecuting authority of the
political subdivision shall be permitted to intervene in the action
within 60 days after the Attorney General notifies the court of its
intentions. The court may authorize intervention thereafter upon a
showing that all the requirements of Section 387 of the Code of Civil
Procedure have been met.
(9) The defendant shall not be required to respond to any
complaint filed under this section until 30 days after the complaint
is unsealed and served upon the defendant pursuant to Section 583.210
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(10) When a person brings an action under this subdivision, no other
person may bring a related action based on the facts underlying the
pending action.
(d) (1) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought
under subdivision (c) against a Member of the State Senate or
Assembly, a member of the state judiciary, an elected official in the
executive branch of the state, or a member of the governing body of
any political subdivision if the action is based on evidence or
information known to the state or political subdivision when the
action was brought.
(2) A person may not bring an action under subdivision (c) that is
based upon allegations or transactions that are the subject of a
civil suit or an administrative civil money penalty proceeding in
which the state or political subdivision is already a party.
(3) (A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this
article based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in an
investigation, report, hearing, or audit conducted by or at the
request of the Senate, Assembly, auditor, or governing body of a
political subdivision, or by the news media, unless the action is
brought by the Attorney General or the prosecuting authority of a
political subdivision, or the person bringing the action is an
original source of the information.
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), "original source" means an
individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the.
information on which the allegations are based, who voluntarily
provided the information to the state or political subdivision before
filing an action based on that information, and whose information
provided the basis or catalyst for the investigation, hearing, audit,
or report that led to the public disclosure as described in
subparagraph (A).
(4) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought under
subdivision (c) based upon information discovered by a present or
former employee of the state or a political subdivision during the
course of his or her employment unless that employee first, in good
faith, exhausted existing internal procedures for reporting and
seeking recovery of the falsely claimed sums through official
channels and unless the state or political subdivision failed to act
on the information provided within a reasonable period of time.
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(e) (1) If the state or political subdivision proceeds with the
action, it shall have the primary responsibility for prosecuting the
action. The qui tam plaintiff shall have the right to continue as a
full party to the action.
(2) (A) The state or political subdivision may seek to dismiss the
action for good cause notwithstanding the objections of the qui tam
plaintiff if the qui tam plaintiff has been notified by the state or
political subdivision of the filing of the motion and the court has
provided the qui tam plaintiff with an opportunity to oppose the
motion and present evidence at a hearing.
(B) The state or political subdivision may settle the action with the
defendant notwithstanding the objections of the qui tam plaintiff if
the court determines, after a hearing providing the qui tam plaintiff
an opportunity to present evidence, that the proposed settlement is
fair, adequate, and reasonable under all of the circumstances.
(f) (1) If the state or political subdivision elects not to
proceed, the qui tam plaintiff shall have the same right to conduct
the action as the Attorney General or prosecuting authority would
have had if it had chosen to proceed under subdivision (c). If the
state or political subdivision so requests, and at its expense, the
state or political subdivision shall be served with copies of all
pleadings filed in the action and supplied with copies of all
deposition transcripts.
(2) (A) Upon timely application, the court shall permit the state or
political subdivision to intervene in an action with which it had
initially declined to proceed if the interest of the state or
political subdivision in recovery of the property or funds involved
is not being adequately represented by the qui tam plaintiff.
(B) If the state or political subdivision is allowed to intervene
under paragraph (A), the qui tam plaintiff shall retain principal
responsibility for the action and the recovery of the parties shall
be determined as if the state or political subdivision had elected
not to proceed.
(g) (1) (A) If the Attorney General initiates an action pursuant to
subdivision (a) or assumes control of an action initiated by a
prosecuting authority pursuant to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (3)
of subdivision (b), the office of the Attorney General shall receive
a fixed 33 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the
claim, which shall be used to support its ongoing investigation and
prosecution of false claims.
(B) If a prosecuting authority initiates and conducts an action
pursuant to subdivision (b), the office of the prosecuting authority
shall receive a fixed 33 percent of the proceeds of the action or
settlement of the claim, which shall be used to support its ongoing
investigation and prosecution of false claims.
(C) If a prosecuting authority intervenes in an action initiated by
the Attorney General pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) or
remains a party to an action assumed by the Attorney General pursuant
to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (3) of subdivision (b), the court
may award the office of the prosecuting authority a portion of the
Attorney General's fixed 33 percent of the recovery under
subparagraph (A), taking into account the prosecuting authority's
role in investigating and conducting the action.
(2) If the state or political subdivision proceeds with an action
brought by a qui tam plaintiff under subdivision (c), the qui tam
plaintiff shall, subject to paragraphs (4) and (5), receive at least
15 percent but not more than 33 percent of the proceeds of the action
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or settlement of the claim, depending upon the extent to which the
qui tam plaintiff substantially contributed to the prosecution of the
action. When it conducts the action, the Attorney General's office
or the office of the prosecuting authority of the political
subdivision shall receive a fixed 33 percent of the proceeds of the
action or settlement of the claim, which shall be used to support its
ongoing investigation and prosecution of false claims made against
the state or political subdivision. When both the Attorney General
and a prosecuting authority are involved in a qui tam action pursuant
to subparagraph (C) of paragraph (6) of subdivision (c), the court at
its discretion may award the prosecuting authority a portion of the
Attorney General's fixed 33 percent of the recovery, taking into
account the prosecuting authority's contribution to investigating and
conducting the action.
(3) If the state or political subdivision does not proceed with an
action under subdivision (c), the qui tam plaintiff shall, subject to
paragraphs (4) and (5), receive an amount that the court decides is
reasonable for collecting the civil penalty and damages on behalf of
the government. The amount shall be not less than 25 percent and not
more than 50 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement and
shall be paid out of these proceeds.
(4) If the action is one provided for under paragraph (4) of
subdivision (d), the present or former employee of the state or
political subdivision is not entitled to any minimum guaranteed
recovery from the proceeds. The court, however, may award the qui
tam plaintiff those sums from the proceeds as it considers
appropriate, but in no case more than 33 percent of the proceeds if
the state or political subdivision goes forth with the action or 50
percent if the state or political subdivision declines to go forth,
taking into account the significance of the information, the role of
the qui tam plaintiff in advancing the case to litigation, and the
scope of, and response to, the employee's attempts to report and gain
recovery of the falsely claimed funds through official channels.
(5) If the action is one that the court finds to be based
primarily on information from a present or former employee who
actively participated in the fraudulent activity, the employee is not
entitled to any minimum guaranteed recovery from the proceeds. The
court, however, may award the qui tam plaintiff any sums from the
proceeds that it considers appropriate, but in no case more than 33
percent of the proceeds if the state or political subdivision goes
forth with the action or 50 percent if the state or political
subdivision declines to go forth, taking into account the
significance of the information, the role of the qui tam plaintiff in
advancing the case to litigation, the scope of the present or past
employee's involvement in the fraudulent activity, the employee's
attempts to avoid or resist the activity, and all other circumstances
surrounding the activity.
(6) The portion of the recovery not distributed pursuant to
paragraphs (1) to (5), inclusive, shall revert to the state if the
underlying false claims involved state funds exclusively and to the
political subdivision if the underlying false claims involved
political subdivision funds exclusively. If the violation involved
both state and political subdivision funds, the court shall make an
apportionment between the state and political subdivision based on
their relative share of the funds falsely claimed.
(7) For purposes of this section, "proceeds" include civil
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penalties as well as double or treble damages as provided in Section
12651.
(8) If the state, political subdivision, or the qui tam plaintiff
prevails in or settles any action under subdivision (c), the qui tam
plaintiff shall receive an amount for reasonable expenses that the
court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable costs
and attorney's fees. All expenses, costs, and fees shall be awarded
against the defendant and under no circumstances shall they be the
responsibility of the state or political subdivision.
(9) If the state, a political subdivision, or the qui tam
plaintiff proceeds with the action, the court may award to the
defendant its reasonable attorney's fees and expenses against the
party that proceeded with the action if the defendant prevails in the
action and the court finds that the claim was clearly frivolous,
clearly vexatious, or brought solely for purposes of harassment.
(h) The court may stay an act of discovery of the person
initiating the action for a period of not more than 60 days if the
Attorney General or local prosecuting authority show that the act of
discovery would interfere with an investigation or a prosecution of a
criminal or civil matter arising out of the same facts, regardless of
whether the Attorney General or local prosecuting authority proceeds
with the action. This showing shall be conducted in camera.
The court may extend the 60-day period upon a further showing in
camera that the Attorney General or local prosecuting authority has
pursued the criminal or civil investigation or proceedings with
reasonable diligence and any proposed discovery in the civil action
will interfere with the ongoing criminal or civil investigation or
proceedings.
(i) Upon a showing by the Attorney General or local prosecuting
authority that unrestricted participation during the course of the
litigation by the person initiating the action would interfere with
or unduly delay the Attorney General's or local prosecuting
authority'
s prosecution of the case, or would be repetitious, irrelevant, or
for purposes of harassment, the court may, in its discretion, impose
limitations on the person's participation, including the following:
(1) Limiting the number of witnesses the person may call.
(2) Limiting the length of the testimony of the witnesses.
(3) Limiting the person's cross-examination of witnesses.
(4) Otherwise limiting the participation by the person in the
litigation.
(j) The False Claims Act Fund is hereby created in the State
Treasury. Proceeds from the action or settlement of the claim by the
Attorney General pursuant to this article shall be deposited into
this fund. Moneys in. this fund, upon appropriation by the
Legislature, shall be used by the Attorney General to support the
ongoing investigation and prosecution of false claims in furtherance
of this article.

12652.5. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the University
of California shall be considered a political subdivision, and the
General Counsel of the University of California shall be considered a
prosecuting authority for the purposes of this article, and shall
have the right to intervene in an action brought by the Attorney
General or a private party or investigate and bring an action,
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subject to Section 12652, if it is determined that the claim involves
the University of California.

12653.
(a) No employer shall make, adopt, or enforce any rule,
regulation, or policy preventing an employee from disclosing
information to a government or law enforcement agency or from acting
in furtherance of a false claims action, including investigating,
initiating, testifying, or assisting in an action filed or to be
filed under Section 12652.
(b) No employer shall discharge, demote, suspend, threaten,
harass, deny promotion to, or in any other manner discriminate
against, an employee in the terms and conditions of employment
because of lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the employee
or others in disclosing information to a government or law
enforcement agency or in furthering a false claims action, including
investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in, an
action filed or to be filed under Section 12652.
(c) An employer who violates subdivision (b) shall be liable for all
relief necessary to make the employee whole, including
reinstatement with the same seniority status that the employee would
have had but for the discrimination, two times the amount of back
pay, interest on the back pay, compensation for any special damage
sustained as a result of the discrimination, and, where appropriate,
punitive damages. In addition, the defendant shall be required to
pay litigation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. An employee may
bring an action in the appropriate superior court of the state for
the relief provided in this subdivision.
(d) An employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, harassed,
denied promotion, or in any other manner discriminated against in the
terms and conditions of employment by his or her employer because of
participation in conduct which directly or indirectly resulted in a
false claim being submitted to the state or a political subdivision
shall be entitled to the remedies under subdivision (c) if, and only
if, both of the following occur:
(1) The employee voluntarily disclosed information to a government or
law enforcement agency or acted in furtherance of a false claims
action, including investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or
assistance in an action filed or to be filed.
(2) The employee had been harassed, threatened with termination or
demotion, or otherwise coerced by the employer or its management into
engaging in the fraudulent activity in the first place.

12654.
(a) A civil action under Section 12652 may not be filed more
than three years after the date of discovery by the official of the
state or political subdivision charged with responsibility to act in
the circumstances or, in any event, no more than 10 years after the
date on which the violation of Section 12651 is committed.
(b) A civil action under Section 12652 may be brought for activity
prior to January 1, 1988, if the limitations period set in
subdivision (a) has not lapsed.
(c) In any action brought under Section 12652, the state,the
political subdivision, or the qui tam plaintiff shall be required to
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prove all essential elements of the cause of action, including
damages, by a preponderance of the evidence.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a guilty verdict
rendered in a criminal proceeding charging false statements or fraud,
whether upon a verdict after trial or upon a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, except for a plea of nolo contendere made prior to
January 1, 1988, shall estop the defendant from denying the essential
elements of the offense in any action which involves the same
transaction as in the criminal proceeding and which is brought under
subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 12652.
(e) Subdivision (b) of Section 47 of the Civil Code shall not be
applicable to any claim subject to this article.

12655.
(a) The provisions of this article are not exclusive, and the
remedies provided for in this article shall be in addition to any
other remedies provided for in any other law or available under
common law.
(b) If any provision of this article or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the
remainder of the article and the application of the provision to
other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
(c) This article shall be liberally construed and applied to
promote the public interest.
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